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COMMON-LAW BAD FAITH IN WHITE V. WESTERN
TITLE INSURANCE CO.: THE DUTY CONTINUES
I. INTRODUCTION
California courts have held that an implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing exists in every contract.' This covenant requires that
neither party prevent the other from receiving the fruits of their agree-
ment.2 Traditionally, only compensatory damages were recoverable in a
claim for breach of this covenant.3 Courts have found, however, that a
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing may be tortious in
cases involving insurance contracts4 thereby providing additional reme-
dies to injured insureds.' By elevating bad faith breach of contract to a
tort, courts have enabled injured plaintiffs to collect damages that other-
1. The list of cases that have so held is too lengthy to warrant mention in this Note.
However, see Brown v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. 2d 559, 564, 212 P.2d 878, 881 (1949) and
Universal Sales Corp. v. California Press Mfg. Co., 20 Cal. 2d 751, 771, 128 P.2d 665, 677
(1942) for the earliest California cases which held that this covenant is implied in all contracts.
Many subsequent cases which discuss the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing cite
either or both of these cases as controlling authority. See, e.g., Koehrer v. Superior Court, 181
Cal. App. 3d 1155, 1169-70, 226 Cal. Rptr. 820, 828 (1986) and Wallis v. Superior Court, 160
Cal. App. 3d 1109, 1116, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123, 127 (1984).
2. See supra note 1; see also 1 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW § 576, at
493 (8th ed. 1973); 3 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 570-71 (1960); 6 S. WILLISTON,
A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 887 (3d ed. 1962).
3. Traditional contract law provides that damages recoverable for breach of contract are
limited to the anticipated benefits arising from performance of the contract. Section 3300 of
the California Civil Code states that the measure of contract damages is "the amount which
will compensate the party aggrieved for all the detriment proximately caused thereby, or
which, in the ordinary course of things, would be likely to result therefrom." CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 3300 (West 1970). This language incorporates the requirement of foreseeability as originally
set forth in Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854). Consequently, contrac-
tual damages have been limited to those that naturally arise from the breach of contract or
were reasonably foreseeable by the parties at the time of contract formation.
4. See Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 598 P.2d 452, 157 Cal. Rptr.
482 (1979); Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 21 Cal. 3d 910, 582 P.2d 980, 148 Cal. Rptr. 389
(1978); Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 17 Cal. 3d 937, 553 P.2d 584, 132 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1976);
Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973); Crisci v.
Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967); Comunale v. Traders
& Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958); Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co.,
10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970).
5. Tort recovery entails a much broader damages standard than traditional contract re-
covery. Tort concepts allow compensation for "all the detriment proximately caused" by the
wrongful conduct "whether it could have been anticipated or not." CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333
(West 1970). Tort damages, therefore, need not be foreseeable to be recovered, and damages
for emotional distress, physical injury and economic loss are recoverable under a tort theory.
See, eg., Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 598 P.2d 452, 157 Cal. Rptr. 482
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wise would not have been available in an action sounding solely in con-
tract. Insurers, consequently, are being forced to pay out vast sums of
money, imposing a heavy burden on the insurance industry. Rather than
attempting to alleviate this problem, the California courts have perpetu-
ated it. They have continually handed down decisions expanding insur-
ers' liability while placing insurers in a position where their defense is
greatly impeded. One such decision is White v. Western Title Insurance
Co.6
In White, the California Supreme Court held that the duty of good
faith and fair dealing continues between the parties even after a lawsuit is
instituted.7 The White court allowed as admissible evidence (1) the in-
surer's settlement offers made in the course of the lawsuit,' (2) the in-
surer's unsuccessful attempt to secure summary judgment,9 and (3) other
actions taken by the insurer in defending its case which the insured ar-
gued were bad faith acts undertaken for the purpose of delaying the in-
sured's rightful payment."° This Note will discuss the flaws inherent in
the White court's reasoning and rationales. Additionally, it will demon-
strate the negative practical effects of such a decision on the future of bad
faith litigation and will argue that White places undue hardship on both
insurers and their attorneys when attempting to defend against a first-
party bad faith action.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts
In White v. Western Title Insurance Co., 1 plaintiffs, the Whites,
agreed to purchase two lots of land which contained substantial subsur-
face water. 2 The original owners of the land had conveyed to a water
company, River Estates Mutual Water Corporation ("River Estates"),
an "'easement for a right-of-way for the construction and maintenance
of a water pipeline and for the drilling of ... wells . . . '" to take up
water. 3 The deed conveying this interest was duly recorded the day af-
(1979). Punitive damages are also recoverable in a tort action upon a showing of oppression,
fraud or malice. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West Supp. 1987).
6. 40 Cal. 3d 870, 710 P.2d 309, 221 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1985).
7. Id. at 886, 710 P.2d at 317, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 517.
8. Id. at 889, 710 P.2d at 319, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 519.
9. Id. at 879, 894 n.4, 710 P.2d at 312, 323 n.4, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 512, 523 n.4,
10. See infra note 198.
11. 40 Cal. 3d 870, 710 P.2d 309, 221 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1985).
12. Id. at 877, 710 P.2d at 311, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 511.
13. Id.
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ter it was executed.14 The Whites requested preliminary title reports
from defendant, Western Title Insurance Company ("Western Title").15
Although both reports purported to list all recorded easements, liens and
encumbrances, neither report mentioned the water easement of record. 6
Western Title, at the close of escrow, issued the Whites two standard
California Land Title Association title insurance policies which excluded
from coverage unrecorded easements and "'water rights, claims or title
to water.' "17 Neither policy mentioned the recorded water easement."8
Approximately six months after escrow closed on the property,
River Estates notified the Whites of its intention to enforce its ease-
ment.1 9 The Whites refused to allow River Estates on their property.a
River Estates filed suit to quiet title to its easement.2a After the Whites
had duly notified Western Title of the pending action, River Estates de-
cided not to enforce its interest in the property and dismissed the suit.
22
The Whites hired an appraiser to estimate the decrease in value of
their lots resulting from the potential loss of groundwater due to the
easement. Based on the appraiser's estimate, the Whites made a claim
under their policy for $62,947.23 Western Title refused to pay contending
that the Whites' claim was based entirely on decrease in value due to loss
of groundwater and not on decrease in value due to the existence of the
easement.24 Western Title maintained that it was not responsible for the
loss in value due to loss of groundwater since such a decrease was ex-
cluded by the policy. However, it admitted responsibility for whatever
loss in value was attributable to River Estates' right to enter the property
and the occupation of the Whites' land by wells and pipes.25
B. Procedural Posture
In October 1979, the Whites filed suit against Western Title alleging
causes of action for breach of the insurance contract and negligence in
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 877-78, 710 P.2d at 311, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 511 (emphasis omitted).
18. Id. at 877, 710 P.2d at 311, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 511.
19. Id. at 878, 710 P.2d at 311, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 511.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 878, 710 P.2d at 311-12, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 511.
24. Id. at 878, 710 P.2d at 311, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 511.
25. Id. at 878, 710 P.2d at 311-12, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 511.
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the preparation of the preliminary title reports.26 Soon thereafter, West-
ern Title made an unsuccessful motion for summary judgment based on
the claims asserted against it for breach of contract and negligence.27 In
May 1980, based on its own appraisal report, Western Title offered to
settle the case for $3000.28 The Whites rejected the offer since it was,
they felt, unquestionably low, and because Western did not provide them
with a copy of the appraisal.29 One month later, pursuant to section 998
of the California Code of Civil Procedure,30 Western Title served the
Whites with a compromise offer of $5000.31 The Whites rejected the of-
fer and successfully sought leave of court to amend their complaint to
include a count for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.32
The trial court bifurcated the issues of liability and damages, and
trial was had without a jury on the issues of negligence and breach of
contract.33 Since abstractor's liability was still valid California law when
the preliminary title reports were issued,34 the court rendered an inter-
locutory judgment holding Western Title liable for negligence and breach
of contract.35 Western Title then made a new compromise offer of
$15,000 and furnished the Whites with a copy of its appraisal. The
Whites rejected this offer, and the remaining issues were tried before a
26. White v. Western Title Ins. Co., 40 Cal. 3d 870, 878-89, 710 P.2d 309, 312, 221- Cal.
Rptr. 509, 512 (1985).
27. Id. at 879, 710 P.2d at 312, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 512.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. Section 998 provides in pertinent part:
Not less than 10 days prior to commencement of trial, any party may serve an
offer in writing upon any other party to the action to allow judgment to be taken in
accordance with the tdrms and conditions stated at that time .... If the offer is not
accepted prior to trial or within 30 days after it is made, whichever occurs first, it
shall be deemed withdrawn, and cannot be given in evidence upon the trial.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 998(a) (West Supp. 1987) (emphasis added).
31. 40 Cal. 3d at 879, 710 P.2d at 312, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 512.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 884, 710 P.2d at 316, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 516. In California, before January 1,
1982, title reports were deemed to be abstracts of title-the title insurance company's represen-
tation as to the condition of title to real property. Accordingly, the insurance company, as the
abstractor of title, had a duty to list in its preliminary title report all matters of public record
relating to the subject property. See Wilkinson v. Rives, 116 Cal. App. 3d 641, 650, 172 Cal.
Rptr. 254, 258 (1981). On January 1, 1982, however, the legislature enacted section 12340.11
of the California Insurance Code which abolished abstractor's liability for breach of its duty to
list all matters of public record. Under that statute, "[a]ny such report ... shall constitute
[only] a statement of the terms and conditions upon which the insurer is willing to issue its title
policy .. " CAL. INS. CODE § 12340.11 (West Supp. 1987).
35. White, 40 Cal. 3d at 879, 710 P.2d at 312, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 512.
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jury.36 The jury fixed damages for loss of value to the Whites' property
at $100 per acre, or $8400. 3 7
At trial on the issue of bad faith, the Whites told the court of their
intention to present evidence of Western Title's conduct, including settle-
ment offers, during the entire course of litigation.38 Western Title ob-
jected, and the court ruled that it would limit the evidence as to those
events which occurredprior to the interlocutory judgment.39 The Whites
testified accordingly, and the jury returned a verdict for $20,000 in com-
pensatory damages.4 No allowance was made for punitive damages.
Western Title appealed, claiming that the trial court's admission of its
settlement offers and conduct during trial, and the trial court's finding of
Western Title's liability for negligence and breach of contract, consti-
tuted error. The California Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed the
decision of the trial court.
41
III. REASONING OF THE COURT
A. Majority Opinion
In its discussion of Western Title's liability for breach of the cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing, the majority, comprising Justices
Broussard, Bird, Mosk and Reynoso, determined that: (1) the duty of
good faith and fair dealing continues after the commencement of litiga-
tion,42 (2) the imposition of a duty of good faith after litigation does not
prevent an insurer from adequately defending the suit,43 and (3) the ad-
mission of the two settlement offers in this case did not violate section
1152 of the California Evidence Code or section 998 of the California
Code of Civil Procedure. 44
1. Continuation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing after
the commencement of litigation
In White v. Western Title Insurance Co., the court not only admit-
ted the two settlement offers into evidence, but also permitted introduc-
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 890, 710 P.2d at 320, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 520.
42. White v. Western Title Ins. Co., 40 Cal. 3d 870, 885-86, 710 P.2d 309, 316-17, 221 Cal.
Rptr. 509, 516-17 (1985).
43. Id. at 886, 710 P.2d at 317, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 517.
44. Id. at 888-89, 710 P.2d at 318-19, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 518-19.
45. 40 Cal. 3d 870, 710 P.2d 309, 221 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1985).
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tion of Western Title's general trial conduct.46 The court reasoned that
this evidence was admissible because of the continuing duty of good faith
and fair dealing.47 Western Title, on the other hand, argued that once an
insured has initiated a lawsuit against an insurer the parties become ad-
versaries,48 and the insurer no longer owes the insured a duty of good
faith and fair dealing.49 Therefore, it contended, "all evidence relating to
events after plaintiffs filed suit should have been excluded."5
The issue was one of first impression for the California Supreme
Court." Consequently, the court did not cite case law for precedent but
instead formulated its own examples to support its conclusion that the
duty continues after the commencement of litigation. 2
The court stated that "the issue can be resolved as a matter of prin-
ciple. It is clear that the contractual relationship between insurer and the
insured does not terminate with commencement of litigation. ' '15 As an
example in support of its statement, the court described an insurer's du-
ties under an automobile liability policy. Although an insured and in-
surer might be litigating coverage of one accident, in the event of a
subsequent accident, the insured would continue to be protected by the
insurance contract. 4 Additionally, the court reasoned that insurance
companies generally provide policy benefits, such as defense during liti-
gation, while simultaneously bringing declaratory suits to determine
whether they must provide those benefits to the insured. Under such
circumstances, the court stated, the insurer owes the insured a duty of
good faith after suit has been filed. 6
Since the court was bound by a strong "policy of encouraging
prompt investigation and payment of insurance claims,"57 it concluded
that no situation would warrant a differentiation between conduct before
and after a suit was filed. 8 If the duty of good faith and fair dealing
terminated upon the filing of litigation, then the insured "would find it
difficult to prove the prelitigation conduct unreasonable if it could not
46. See infra note 198.
47. White, 40 Cal. 3d at 885-86, 710 P.2d at 317, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 517.
48. Id. at 885, 710 P.2d at 316, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 516.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See id. at 885-86, 710 P.2d at 317, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 517.
53. Id. at 885, 710 P.2d at 317, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 517.
54. Id. at 885-86, 710 P.2d at 317, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 517.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 886, 710 P.2d at 317, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 517.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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present evidence of the postlitigation conduct by way of contrast. 59
Under Western Title's proposed rule, the court reasoned, insurers would
force insureds to file suits as early as possible since their conduct would
no longer be restricted by a duty of good faith and fair dealing. To ac-
complish this result, insurers would delay investigation and settlement
negotiations until such time when they were not bound by a duty to the
insured,6" thus undermining the policy of prompt investigation and set-
tlement of claims.6
The defendant contended that imposing a duty of good faith and fair
dealing after the filing of a lawsuit would interfere with the insurer's de-
fense.62 First, the defendant insisted that any investigation of an in-
sured's claim would be hampered since the insurer would be obligated to
disclose to the insured any information it found which was favorable to
the insured's claim.63 Second, the defendant argued that the attorney
who prepared the case for trial could not actually litigate it since that
lawyer would be a key witness to the insurer's good faith during the pre-
trial period.'
The court responded unsympathetically to the defendant's argu-
ments. It stated that:
[n]either of these concerns... justify [sic] a distinction between
the period before suit is filed and the period after it is filed.
Certainly the insurer should have investigated the factual basis
of the claim before suit is filed, and may well have utilized
counsel to evaluate that claim. The issue of contractual liability
can be tried separately, and prior to the trial on the good faith
claim, as was done in [White].6"
In other words: (1) the insurer, before trial, should have diligently inves-
tigated the insured's claim and revealed all the favorable facts supporting
that claim; and (2) the issues of liability and good faith can be bifurcated,
and the lawyer who prepared the issue of liability could try that issue
59. Id.
60. The court's invalidation of Western Title's proposed rule regarding the termination of
the duty of good faith and fair dealing is unsound. In speculating about the effects of such a
rule, the court failed to consider that an insurer's delaying investigation or settlement negotia-
tions before suit was filed would itself constitute bad faith. Under Western Title's rule, this
conduct would be provable since it occurred before suit was filed. An insurer, consequently,
would not engage in these pre-litigation tactics even if the duty of good faith terminated upon
the filing of a lawsuit.
61. White, 40 Cal. 3d at 886, 710 P.2d at 317, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 517.
62. Id. at 886, 710 P.2d at 317, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 517.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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even if needed as a witness in the trial on good faith. Impliedly conced-
ing that another attorney would have to try the issue of good faith if the
liability attorney were a critical witness to the insurer's good faith, the
court concluded that good faith and fair dealing must be determined on a
case-by-case basis. Thus, the insurance company's hardship is having to
engage new counsel.
Additionally, the court expressed great confidence in the ability of
jurors to "evaluate the insurer's conduct in relation to [the adversarial
posture of the parties]."66 In other words, the court seemed confident
that jurors would not confuse litigation tactics with bad faith conduct or
settlement offers with an admission of liability. Moreover, the court rea-
soned, under section 352 of the California Evidence Code a trial court
has discretion to "exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the probability that its admission will.., create substan-
tial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading
the jury,"6 7 thereby affording insurers adequate protection from
prejudice.
68
2. Admissibility of settlement offers under section 1152 of the
California Evidence Code and section 998 of the California
Code of Civil Procedure
The defendant also contended that the admission of the settlement
offers of $3000 and $5000 violated section 1152 of the California Evi-
dence Code.69 Section 1152 prohibits the introduction of settlement of-
fers if the purpose of their introduction is to prove liability for the
original loss. However, the court found that these settlement offers were
not introduced to prove liability for breach of contract, but rather "to
prove [the insurer's] failure to process the claim fairly and in good
faith."7 In other words, the evidence was admissible to prove the "in-
strumentality" of the tort.
In support of its distinction between proof of liability and proof of
instrumentality, the court cited Fletcher v. Western National Life Insur-
ance Co. 71 In Fletcher, the insurer wrote two letters to the insured accus-
ing him of fraudulently concealing a congenital back defect. The second
letter offered to settle the insured's claim by allowing him to retain the
66. Id.
67. CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 1966).
68. White, 40 Cal. 3d at 886-87 n.9, 710 P.2d at 317 n.9, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 517 n.9.
69. Id. at 887, 888, 710 P.2d at 317, 319, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 517, 519.
70. Id. at 887, 710 P.2d at 318, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 518.
71. 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970).
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payments he had already received under a disability policy.72 The in-
sured refused the offer and, over objection, introduced both letters into
evidence at a trial against the insurer on a bad faith claim.73 The Fletcher
court stated:
"[Defendants' suggestion] that their letters were improperly ad-
mitted into evidence is not meritorious .... [T]he applicable
code provision (Evid. Code, § 1152) prohibits the introduction
into evidence of an offer to compromise a claim for the purpose
of proving liability for that claim. If the letter of October 4,
1966, were considered an offer to compromise, it would be an
offer to compromise the claim of liability under the policy.
Plaintiff, however, did not offer the letter to prove liability
under the policy, but, rather, as a part of his proof of the instru-
mentality of the tort. Section 1152, therefore, did not preclude
its admission."'74
Western Title attempted to distinguish Fletcher75 on the ground that the
letters in Fletcher were sent before litigation was commenced, whereas in
White, the settlement offers were made after suit was filed.76 The White
court found this distinction to be immaterial reasoning that the "duty of
good faith and fair dealing does not disappear with the filing of suit
",77
Finally, Western Title argued that its second offer, filed as an offer
to compromise under section 998 of the California Civil Procedure
Code,78 was erroneously admitted by the trial court.79 Western Title
contended that Fletcher's reasoning was inapplicable to section 99880
compromise offers since section 998, unlike section 1152, is an express
bar. Section 998 states that any offer made pursuant to it "cannot be
given in evidence upon the trial."'" The White court, however, disagreed
with Western Title stating "that despite their difference in wording sec-
tions 1152 and 998 should receive a parallel construction."8 2 The court
72. Id. at 390, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 85-86.
73. Id. at 391, 396, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 86, 90.
74. White, 40 Cal. 3d at 887, 710 P.2d at 318, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 518 (quoting Fletcher v.
Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 396, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 90 (1970)) (emphasis
in original).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See supra note 30.
79. White, 40 Cal. 3d at 888, 710 P.2d at 319, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 518-19.
80. Id.
81. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 998(b)(2) (West Supp. 1987).
82. White, 40 Cal. 3d at 888, 710 P.2d at 319, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 519.
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sought to reconcile the two statutes:
[s]ection 1152 states that offers are inadmissible to prove "lia-
bility for the loss or damage," which we have construed to refer
to liability for that loss or damage to be compromised by the
offer. Section 998 ... states that an offer cannot be "given in
evidence upon the trial." 3
Accordingly, the White court concluded that the language in section 998
refers only "to the trial upon the liability which the offer proposed to
compromise."" a Since evidence of the settlement offers was not intro-
duced at the trial on the issue of contractual liability-the trial on liabil-
ity which the offer sought to compromise-but rather at the trial on
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the court held that
the offers were not barred by section 998.85
Conversely, the supreme court affirmed the trial court's exclusion of
evidence offered by Western Title of a $15,000 settlement offer made af-
ter the interlocutory judgment against Western Title. 6 The court based
its affirmation on the ground that "[o]nce the court had determined lia-
bility, defendant's willingness to make a reasonable settlement offer has
little tendency to prove that defendant has been acting fairly and in good
faith toward its insured."
87
B. Concurring Opinion of Justice Grodin
Justice Grodin fundamentally agreed with the reasoning of the ma-
jority opinion. He saw no reason why the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing should become inoperative upon the filing of a lawsuit.,
He argued that in a case where an insurer has acted in bad faith by un-
reasonably withholding payment of policy benefits before suit has been
filed and continues to act in bad faith after the commencement of litiga-
tion, "there seems to be no compelling reason why the right to recover
for that continuing wrong should terminate either because the insurer
decides to file a preemptive action for declaratory relief or because the
83. Id. (quoting CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 998 (West 1966)).
84. Id. at 889, 710 P.2d at 319, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 519.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 889 n.12, 710 P.2d at 319 n.12, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 519 n.12. Western Title offered
evidence of the $15,000 settlement offer to show that it was acting in good faith during litiga-
tion. In light of an $8400 interlocutory judgment, an offer of $5000 does not seem unreasona-
ble especially since the White's damages were not easily ascertainable. After such a judgment,
a $15,000 offer seems even less unreasonable.
87. Id.
88. White v. Western Title Ins. Co., 40 Cal. 3d 870, 891, 710 P.2d 309, 320, 221 Cal. Rptr.
509, 520 (1985) (Grodin, J., concurring).
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insured, under the compulsion of the insurer's recalcitrance, decides to
file suit himself."89 Accordingly, he concluded that the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing continues after the time when a lawsuit has been
initiated.90
Justice Grodin also concurred with the majority's conclusion that
the continuation of a duty of good faith and fair dealing does not inter-
fere with an insurer's defense.91 He interpreted the majority opinion as
meaning "that all of an insurer's litigation tactics [would not] be subject
to scrutiny by a jury on the basis of a bad faith claim." 92 Normal rules of
litigation, he said, would be adequate protection against any abuse by the
insured.
93
Additionally, Justice Grodin analogized the admissibility of settle-
ment offers under these circumstances to the legislative decision that evi-
dence of settlement offers be admissible to prove a violation of section
790.03(h)(5) of the California Insurance Code.94 He opined that from a
89. Id. at 891, 710 P.2d at 320-21, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 520 (Grodin, J., concurring).
90. Id. at 891, 710 P.2d at 320, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 520 (Grodin, J., concurring).
91. Id. (Grodin, J., concurring).
92. Id. (Grodin, J., concurring).
93. Id. (Grodin, J., concurring).
94. Id. at 891 n.2, 710 P.2d at 321 n.2, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 521 n.2 (Grodin, J., concurring).
Section 790.03(h)(5) of the California Insurance Code states that an insurer acts unfairly by
"[n]ot attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair, and equitable settlements of claims
in which liability has become reasonably clear." CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h)(5) (West Supp.
1987). Justice Grodin's implication in this footnote is that evidence of an insurer's settlement
offers would have to be admissible to prove a violation of this statutory duty.
One author argued that this reliance on section 790.03(h)(5) to justify admitting evidence
of settlement offers was illogical. He distinguished between the statutory and common-law
duty of good faith and fair dealing.
A first party action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
such as that pled in White, is fundamentally different from a third party action under
section 790.03(h)(5). If an action for breach of the implied covenant is separated
from the breach of contract action, it becomes apparent that the basis for the alleged
bad faith is, in fact, the breach of the contract itself. In a section 790.03(h)(5) action
by a third party, the basis of the claim is an incident unrelated to the violation of the
statute. The playing out of the third party litigation would embody the bad faith.
The distinction is essential to the understanding of the misconception in White. In
the first party context the breach of contract is the act from which the bad faith
arises. The bad faith action arises at the moment of the breach. In the third party
context it is the failure to attempt to settle when liability becomes reasonably clear
that gives rise to the cause of action.
This attempt by the White majority to apply the standards of section
790.03(h)(5) to a first party breach of the implied covenant action is the stumbling
block. The distinction between the two causes of actions is considerable and impor-
tant. In the section 790.03(h)(5) action the insurer and the third party claimant are
not in adversarial positions in the same sense that the insured and insurer are when
breach of the implied covenant is alleged.
Nelsen, White v. Western Title: Unsettled Waters, 14 W. ST. U.L. REV. 173, 181 (1986) (foot-
notes omitted).
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policy standpoint95 there was no distinction between the common-law
duty and the statutory duty regarding the admissibility of settlement of-
fers to prove the elements of the tort.
9 6
Justice Grodin's viewpoint diverged from that of the majority in his
brief discussion of the court's exclusion of the $15,000 offer made after
the interlocutory judgment.97 He believed that the third settlement offer
should have been admitted because the jury's knowledge of that offer
might have aided it in its evaluation of the bad faith claim.98 The first
two offers, he argued, only weakly supported the insured's theory.99
Moreover, Justice Grodin reasoned that by excluding the third offer, the
court gave the jury an incomplete picture on which to base their final
determination."° Since the verdict was relatively modest, however, Jus-
tice Grodin concluded that the error did not require a reversal and
remand.10
C. Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Justice Lucas
Justice Lucas argued that the majority's conclusion-that the duty
of good faith and fair dealing continues between the parties after the fil-
ing of a lawsuit-was misplaced. He contended that the majority's anal-
ysis should have "focus[ed] on the nature of the relationship between the
parties as to the particular claim at issue."' °2 In support of his conten-
tion, Justice Lucas stated that "[o]ne [who] has.., negligently injured
another continues thereafter to have a duty to refrain from inflicting new
harm upon the victim. Nonetheless, he is still subject to suit and entitled
to defend himself on the issue of whether the completed transaction in-
volved negligence on his part."' °3
Furthermore, Justice Lucas analogized to the situation faced by an
95. The policy which both the statutory and common-law duties purport to promote is the
prompt, fair and equitable settlement of claims.
96. 40 Cal. 3d at 891 n.2, 710 P.2d at 321 n.2, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 521 n.2 (Grodin, J.,
concurring). But see supra note 94.
97. Id. at 891, 710 P.2d at 321, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 521 (Grodin, J., concurring).
98. Id. (Grodin, J., concurring).
99. Id. (Grodin, J., concurring). Justice Grodin argued that the $15,000 settlement offer
would have supported Western Title's contention that it acted in good faith during litigation.
He said that such evidence "might have been helpful to the jury's evaluation despite its some-
what disparate context .... " Id. (Grodin, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
100. Id. (Grodin, J., concurring).
101. Id. (Grodin, J., concurring).
102. White v. Western Title Ins. Co., 40 Cal. 3d 870, 892, 710 P.2d 309, 322, 221 Cal. Rptr.
509, 522 (1985) (Lucas, J., concurring and dissenting) (emphasis in original).
103. Id. at 892-93, 710 P.2d at 322, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 522 (Lucas, J., concurring and dissent-
ing) (emphasis in original).
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attorney sued for malpractice."° In such cases, the lawyer's defense is
not burdened by the attorney-client privilege.'10 There is no "'continu-
ing duty of good faith' "106 as to that particular claim. As to all other
matters, however, which the attorney may be handling on this client's
behalf, the attorney-client privilege remains intact. Reasoning that there
is a "fundamental shift in the nature of the attorney-client relationship
when a malpractice suit is filed," 10 7 Justice Lucas concluded that there is
a similar alteration of the insured-insurer relationship when the insured
files a lawsuit on a claim disputed by the insurer.108
Unlike the majority, Justice Lucas saw the early filing of suits as
beneficial. He reasoned that earlier filing would "force earlier serious
investigation and [might] therefore lead to earlier payment of benefits to
the insured."'0 9 If, as the majority stated, insurers would attempt "'to
delay serious investigation until after suit was filed,' ,,10 then early com-
mencement of litigation would be preferred because it would promote
investigation and early resolution of the claim.
Justice Lucas then turned to the question of the insurer's right to an
adequate defense. His argument predominantly centered around the evi-
dence which would be allowed under the majority's formulation of the
rule. Since the majority did not limit the type of evidence that could be
introduced at a subsequent trial, Justice Lucas feared that "[alny aspect
of the defendant's 'conduct' during the first trial [would] now be fair
game."'' Consequently, if the insurer is unsuccessful in the first trial on
liability, then anything the insurer did to defend his position at that trial
may be considered conduct engaged in to preclude the insured from re-
ceiving the fruits of the insurance contract." 2
Justice Lucas especially objected to the admission of litigation strat-
egies and tactics." 3 Juries are understandably ignorant of litigation
104. Id. at 893, 710 P.2d at 322, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 522 (Lucas, J., concurring and
dissenting).
105. Id. (Lucas, J., concurring and dissenting).
106. Id. (Lucas, J., concurring and dissenting).
107. Id. (Lucas, J., concurring and dissenting).
108. Id. (Lucas, J., concurring and dissenting).
109. Id. at 894, 710 P.2d at 322-23, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 522 (Lucas, J., concurring and
dissenting).
110. Id. at 893, 710 P.2d at 322, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 522 (Lucas, J., concurring and
dissenting).
111. Id. at 895, 710 P.2d at 323, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 523 (Lucas, J., concurring and
dissenting).
112. Id. at 895, 710 P.2d at 323-24, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 523-24 (Lucas, J., concurring and
dissenting) (emphasis in original).
113. Id. at 895, 710 P.2d at 324, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 524 (Lucas, J., concurring and
dissenting).
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practices and techniques.114 As a result, they may misunderstand and
misinterpret defensive tactics such as the defendant's motion for an ex-
tension of time, its motion for summary judgment, or its request for in-
terrogatories, as being relevant to the issue of the defendant's bad faith.
Juries may "second guess the defendant's rationales for taking a particu-
lar course." 1 5 Moreover, he stated, the proof of bad faith is facilitated,
and the insurer's defense is impeded since this evidence may be intro-
duced without a showing of the insurer's immoral intent or malice." 
6
The standard for proof of bad faith is one of subjective unreasonableness
as evidenced by Justice Lucas's statement that "[t]he jury found only
unreasonableness, and not malice or bad intent .... 117 when it deter-
mined Western Title's liability for breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. Unreasonableness is a much lower and much more
easily proved standard than malice or immoral intent.
In illuminating this argument, Justice Lucas compared this situation
to the facts of In re Marriage of Flaherty." 8 There, the supreme court
114. Id. (Lucas, J., concurring and dissenting).
115. Id. (Lucas, J., concurring and dissenting).
116. Id. at 897, 710 P.2d at 325, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 525 (Lucas, J., concurring and dissent-
ing). In Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 21 Cal. 3d 910, 582 P.2d 980, 148 Cal. Rptr. 389 (1978),
the supreme court stated:
The terms "good faith" and "bad faith" . . . are not meant to connote the ab-
sence or presence of positive misconduct of a malicious or immoral nature-consid-
erations which... are more properly concerned in the determination of liability for
punitive damages. Here we deal only with the question of breach of the implied
covenant and the resultant liability for compensatory damages. As stated by the
draftsmen of the Restatement of Contracts, "[tihe phrase 'good faith' is used in a
variety of contexts, and its meaning varies somewhat in the context. Good faith
performance or enforcement of a contract emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed com-
mon purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of the other party; it
excludes [from consideration] a variety of types of conduct characterized [in other
contexts] as involving 'bad faith' because they violate community standards of de-
cency, fairness or reasonableness."
Id. at 921-22 n.5, 582 P.2d at 986 n.5, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 395 n.5 (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 231 comment a (Tent. Draft Nos. 1-7, 1974)) (citations omitted)
(emphasis in original).
117. White, 40 Cal. 3d at 899, 710 P.2d at 327, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 527 (Lucas, J., concurring
and dissenting).
118. 31 Cal. 3d 637, 646 P.2d 179, 183 Cal. Rptr. 508 (1982). In Flaherty, Jaquelyn and
James Flaherty were involved in divorce proceedings and a custody battle over their daughter,
Missy. Id. at 640, 646 P.2d at 181, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 510. James had filed a petition requesting
custody of Missy and child support from Jaquelyn. Id. The court awarded temporary custody
to James and visitation rights to Jaquelyn. After the custody award, James moved to Ken-
tucky with Missy. Approximately one year later, while the divorce proceedings were still
pending, Jaquelyn asked the court to modify its temporary order and award joint custody to
each of the parents. Id. Although the court denied the request for joint custody, it modified
the visitation order to provide that Missy could visit Jaquelyn for four months each year. Id.
at 640-41, 646 P.2d at 181, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 510. According to the order, Jaquelyn was to pay
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considered guidelines for determining when an appeal is frivolous and
warrants sanctions.119 It balanced the interest of avoiding improper con-
duct against the interest of allowing attorneys to freely promote their
clients' interests. 120 The Flaherty court held that counsel must have the
freedom to file appeals on their clients' behalf without fear that an appel-
late court will second guess their reasons.1 2 1 Justice Lucas felt that the
majority's holding prevented insurers from asserting valid claims without
fear of suffering a greater penalty "'than that typically imposed on de-
the transportation costs of Missy's trips to California, and James was to pay for her return
trips. Id. at 641, 646 P.2d at 181, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 510.
The court later entered an interlocutory decree dissolving the Flahertys' marriage. Id. at
641, 646 P.2d at 182, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 511. The decree incorporated the prior orders regard-
ing custody, visitation rights and costs of transportation. The court, however, denied James'
request for child support. Id.
James appealed the issues of denial of child support and divided payment of transporta-
tion costs. In affirming the trial court's judgment, the court of appeal imposed a $500 sanction
against James' attorney for filing a frivolous appeal. Id. The California Supreme Court af-
firmed the trial court's judgment, but concluded that James' appeal was not frivolous. Id. at
645, 651, 654, 646 P.2d at 185, 188, 190, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 513, 517, 519.
In determining whether James' appeal was frivolous, the supreme court stated:
An appeal taken for an improper motive represents a time-consuming and disruptive
use of the judicial process. Similarly, an appeal taken despite the fact that no reason-
able attorney could have thought it meritorious ties up judicial resources and diverts
attention from the already burdensome volume of work at the appellate courts.
Thus, an appeal should be held to be frivolous only when it is prosecuted for an
improper motive-to harrass the respondent or delay the effect of a judgment-or
when it indisputably has no merit-when any reasonable attorney would agree that
the appeal is totally and completely without merit.
However, any definition must be read so as to avoid a serious chilling effect on
the assertion of litigants' rights on appeal. Counsel and their clients have a right to
present issues that are arguably correct, even if it is extremely unlikely that they will
win on appeal. An appeal that is simply without merit is not by definition frivolous
and should not incur sanctions. Counsel should not be deterred from filing such
appeals out of a fear of reprisals....
. Viewed under this standard, James' appeal in this case cannot be deemed
frivolous. There is no evidence of subjective bad faith. In contrast to most of the
cases where sanctions have been imposed, James had nothing to gain from delay....
Id. at 650-51, 646 P.2d at 187-88, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 516-17 (emphasis in original) (citations
omitted).
119. Id. at 650, 646 P.2d at 187-88, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 516-17.
120. Id. at 650-51, 646 P.2d at 187-88, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 516-17.
121. Id. at 650, 646 P.2d at 187, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 516. Justice Lucas quoted the Flaherty
court:
"'Free access to the courts is an important and valuable aspect of an effective system
ofjurisprudence, and a party possessing a colorable claim must be allowed to assert it
without fear of suffering a penalty more severe than that typically imposed on de-
feated parties.'"
White, 40 Cal. 3d at 896, 710 P.2d at 324, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 524 (Lucas, J., concurring and
dissenting) (quoting In re Marriage of Flaherty, 31 Cal. 3d 637, 648, 646 P.2d 179, 186, 183
Cal. Rptr. 508, 515 (1982) (quoting Young v. Redman, 55 Cal. App. 3d 827, 838, 128 Cal.
Rptr. 86, 93 (1976))).
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feated parties.' ",122 Accordingly, he concluded that the position of the
White court destroyed the balance achieved in Flaherty between avoiding
improper conduct and assuring that lawyers are free to actively assert
their clients' interests.
123
Justice Lucas also discussed the defendant's right to conduct a vig-
orous defense when involuntarily haled into court. To support this posi-
tion, he cited Bertero v. National General Corp.124 In Bertero, the
122. Id. (Lucas, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting In re Marriage of Flaherty, 31 Cal.
3d 637, 648, 646 P.2d 179, 186, 183 Cal. Rptr. 508, 515 (1982) (quoting Young v. Redman, 55
Cal. App. 3d 827, 838, 128 Cal. Rptr. 86, 93 (1976))).
123. Id. at 897, 710 P.2d at 325, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 525 (Lucas, J., concurring and
dissenting).
124. 13 Cal. 3d 43, 529 P.2d 608, 118 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1974). In 1958, Mr. Bertero was
elected president of National General Corporation (National). A power struggle ensued
within National one year after his election, and Bertero resigned as president, but retained his
seat on its board of directors. Upon resigning, Bertero entered into a 10-year employment
contract with National under which he was to serve as a part-time executive for five years and
as a consultant to the company for five years. Id. at 48, 529 P.2d at 612, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
The board of directors unanimously ratified the agreement. Id. Eugene Klein, one of the
members of the board when Bertero's agreement was ratified, became National's president in
1961. Id. at 48-49, 529 P.2d at 612-13, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 188-89. Bertero and Klein frequently
disagreed with each other and their relationship dissolved into one of animosity. Id. at 49, 529
P.2d at 613, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 189. Consequently, Bertero resigned from his directorship, but
refused to rescind his 10-year employment contract or surrender his stock options obtained
before and while he was president. Id. After Klein secured control of National's board of
directors, Bertero surrendered some of his stock options. Id. Klein, however, continually
attempted to persuade Bertero to rescind his contract and surrender the remaining portion of
his stock options. Id. Bertero refused. Id. Klein then declared Bertero's contract invalid and
unenforceable, and he terminated Bertero's stock options and all of his employment benefits
under the contract. Id.
In June 1962, Bertero filed a declaratory relief action against National and Klein as to his
employment agreement and stock options. The defendants filed a cross-complaint seeking the
recovery of salary in the amount of $104,000 already paid pursuant to Bertero's employment
contract. Thejudgment was rendered in favor of Bertero and affirmed on appeal. Bertero then
brought an action seeking damages for malicious prosecution of the cross-complaint. Id. The
California Supreme Court concluded that defendants' cross-complaint constituted malicious
prosecution. It reasoned:
Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the judgment, we find that defendants'
conduct consisted of filing fabricated claims in order to coerce Bertero to settle or
abandon a legitimate claim. This flagrant abuse of the judicial process is precisely
the type of tortious conduct that an award of exemplary damages is designed to
deter.
Id. at 65, 529 P.2d at 624, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 200. The court also discussed the necessary
element of malice:
[Mialice in fact may be proved by the inference from the want of probable cause.
The jury in the instant case was so charged and evidence of want of probable cause
was sufficient proof of malice to justify an award of punitive damages. The jury was
also properly instructed that in order to establish malice for both liability and puni-
tive damages personal hostility or ill will need not be shown; that the absence of an
honest and sincere belief in the validity of the cross-action was sufficient.
Id. at 66, 529 P.2d at 625, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 201 (citations and footnote omitted).
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supreme court found that a claim asserted by the defendant in a cross-
pleading could give rise to an action for malicious prosecution. The Ber-
tero court, however, refused to recognize a tort of malicious defense.'25
In so doing, the court stressed the importance of a defendant's right to
assert a defense. The White majority failed to recognize the principle
established in Bertero.'26 In addition, the White court overlooked the
impact of the California Supreme Court holding in Neal v. Farmers In-
surance Exchange:27 A breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing requires no showing of malice or immoral intent. Justice Lucas
125. Id. at 52, 529 P.2d at 613, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 191. The elements of the proposed tort,
"malicious defense," are "[a]ssertion of a defense, which the defendant knows or should know
is without credible basis, for the purpose of delay" and the fundamental requirement of malice.
Van Patten & Willard, The Limits ofAdvocacy: A Proposal for the Tort of Malicious Defense in
Civil Litigation, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 891, 936, 931 (1984).
126. Justice Lucas stated:
Since the elements of a cause of action for a breach of the duty of good faith and fair
dealing do not echo those required by an action alleging malicious prosecution (or
defense), it is clear that the majority has taken a giant leap forward beyond that
contemplated even by those advocating recognition of a general new tort based on
improper defensive conduct.
White, 40 Cal. 3d at 896-97 n.6, 710 P.2d at 325 n.6, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 525 n.6 (Lucas, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
127. 21 Cal. 3d 910, 582 P.2d 980, 148 Cal. Rptr. 389 (1978). In July 1970, Mrs. Neal was
seriously injured while riding as a passenger in a car operated by her husband. The car was
struck broadside by an automobile driven by an uninsured motorist. Id. at 918, 582 P.2d at
983, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 392. Mrs. Neal spent the succeeding two months in the hospital. Ini-
tially she suffered total paralysis from the neck down, but that condition gradually changed to
total disability involving serious sensory and motor defects. Id. She remained totally disabled
until her death from cancer in 1974, about one year before trial. Id.
At the time of the accident, Mr. and Mrs. Neal were covered under an automobile insur-
ance policy issued by Farmers Insurance Exchange (Farmers). The policy included a medical
payment provision with $5000 limits and an uninsured motorist provision with $15,000 limits.
Id. A few days after the accident, Mr. Neal contacted attorney Paul Gergen, who then at-
tempted to communicate with Farmers in order to expedite payment of Mrs. Neal's claim.
Approximately three months after it was first contacted, Farmers paid $5000 pursuant to the
medical payment coverage. Id. It refused, however, to pay the $15,000 policy limit under the
uninsured motorist coverge. Id. Farmers contended:
(1) that it was entitled, under an express policy provision to offset the amount paid
under the medical payment coverage against any amount due under the uninsured
motorist coverage; (2) that the accident resulted solely from the negligence of Mr.
Neal, thus precluding liability on the part of the uninsured motorist; and (3) that
contributory negligence on the part of Mr. Neal might be legally imputed to Mrs.
Neal.
Id. (emphasis in original).
In January 1971, Gergen wrote to Farmers requesting a prompt settlement. Id. Because
of the Neals' dire financial condition, Gergen asked that $10,000 be paid immediately, reserv-
ing the question of the $5000 offset for future determination. Id. at 918-19, 582 P.2d at 984,
148 Cal. Rptr. at 393. On April 21, 1971, after consulting its attorney, Farmers responded
that it would settle the case for $5000. Farmers' attorney had concluded "(1) that the law was
unclear on the matter of offset, (2) that any negligence on the part of Mr. Neal could not be
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was concerned over "the potential chilling effect on the right of a defend-
ant to present its case"'1 28 since any conduct could almost unqualifiedly
be used to prove the defendant's bad faith.
In conclusion to this segment of his argument, Justice Lucas stated:
On the one side is the importance of affording defendants an
opportunity to defend (especially where there is not even a pre-
liminary showing of any malicious intent on the defendant's
part) and the potential for prejudice to them if their trial "con-
duct" may be second-guessed in a subsequent action. On the
other is the necessity to admit the information here at issue into
evidence. I conclude that without more showing the former in-
terests must prevail. 129
Justice Lucas also disagreed with the majority's failure to apply sec-
imputed to Mrs. Neal, and (3) that 'at best' the case was '50-50' on liability." Id. at 919, 582
P.2d at 984, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 393.
Gergen rejected Farmers' offer on May 1, 1971 and repeated the Neals' previous settle-
ment offer. Id. Farmers did not respond. Accordingly, Gergen again wrote Farmers, this
time threatening it with arbitration proceedings. Once again, Farmers did not respond within
10 days. Id.
Gergen turned the case over to Mr. Aitken, another attorney, who made a demand for
arbitration. Id. The proceedings commenced on February 16, 1973, and in April 1973, the
arbitrator found in favor of Mrs. Neal on the issue of liability. Id. at 919-20, 582 P.2d at 984,
148 Cal. Rptr. at 393. Farmers then paid her the full $15,000.
Mrs. Neal subsequently initiated an action seeking compensatory and punitive damages
for Farmers' bad faith refusal to settle promptly. Id. at 920, 582 P.2d at 984-95, 148 Cal. Rptr.
at 393-94. The jury returned a verdict of $1,528,211.35 in favor of Mrs. Neal. Id. That
amount was reduced to $749,011.49 by remittitur. Id. Affirming the judgment, the supreme
court stated:
We can deal briefly with Farmers' first contention that there was no substantial
evidence that it breached [the duty of good faith and fair dealing]. Suffice it to say
that the substantial record herein ... contains abundant evidence, a good deal of it
conflicting, on the subject of defendant's conduct and motives. While some of the
evidence was to the effect that Farmers did no more than assert its legal position
reasonably and in good faith, the jury herein concluded to the contrary.
It did so on the basis of evidence of undeniable substantiality to the effect that
Farmers knew at an early date-certainly no later than its receipt of Mr. Gergen's
letter dated May 1, 1971-that it had no colorable defense to plaintiff's claim under
the uninsured motorist provisions of its policy and that the only genuine issue was
that of the availability of an offset for the $5000 paid by it under the medical payment
provisions; that Mr. Gergen's offer to settle for an additional $10,000, reserving the
offset question for later decision by an appropriate tribunal, was wholly reasonable
and should in good faith have been promptly accepted; and that Farmers' subsequent
refusal to accept the offer constituted a breach of its obligation to deal fairly and in
good faith with its insured by "refusing, without proper cause, to compensate its
insured for a loss covered by the policy."
Id. at 921, 582 P.2d at 985-86, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 394-95 (quoting Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co.,
9 Cal. 3d 566, 574, 510 P.2d 1032, 1037, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 485 (1973)) (footnotes omitted).
For a discussion of Gruenberg, see infra text accompanying notes 173-79.
128. White, 40 Cal. 3d at 897, 710 P.2d at 325, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 525.
129. Id. (Lucas, J., concurring and dissenting) (footnote omitted).
COMMON-LAW BAD FAITH
tion 1152 of the California Evidence Code to bar evidence of the settle-
ment offers. 130 Section 1152, he stated, was "'based upon the public
policy in favor of settlement of disputes without litigation.' ",131 The ma-
jority, Lucas felt, ignored this underlying policy as well as the statute
itself which he interpreted as having broad application.
132
Moreover, Justice Lucas distinguished the facts of Fletcher v. West-
ern National Life Insurance Co.133 from those of White. In Fletcher, he
reasoned, the admissible settlement offers were made prior to the filing of
the lawsuit, and evidence of those settlement offers was used to prove the
elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. In
White, the settlement offers were made after the lawsuit was filed, and
they were used to prove the elements of the tort of bad faith breach of
contract. Justice Lucas called the application of Fletcher to White a
"wholesale acceptance' 134 since the Fletcher court did not have the op-
portunity "to consider whether the making of settlement offers or other
conduct following commencement of trial should be admitted despite
section 1152's bar."' 35 According to Justice Lucas, the court extended
Fletcher with only an "empty nod"'' 36 at the policy behind section 1152.
Justice Lucas also argued that since the two prejudgment offers had
been admitted, the third settlement offer of $15,000 should have been
introduced into evidence. 137 He reasoned that in excluding the 1982 of-
fer, it appeared to the jury that the insurer's last offer to settle was made
twenty months before and that there was no attempt to settle after liabil-
ity had been determined. Justice Lucas concluded that the court's failure
to admit this evidence was highly prejudicial to the insurer since the jury
may very well have considered the lack of a subsequent settlement offer
as a further indication of bad faith in light of the earlier lower offers.' 3 8
130. Id. at 894, 710 P.2d at 323, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 523 (Lucas, J., concurring and
dissenting).
131. Id. (Lucas, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting 7 CALIFORNIA L. REVISION
COMM'N, REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS & STUDIES 29, 218 (1965)).
132. See infra note 241.
133. 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970). See supra text accompanying notes 71-
74 for a discussion of Fletcher.
134. 40 Cal. 3d at 894, 710 P.2d at 323, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 523 (Lucas, J., concurring and
dissenting).
135. Id. (Lucas, J., concurring and dissenting).
136. Id. (Lucas, J., concurring and dissenting).
137. Id. at 898-99, 710 P.2d at 326, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 526 (Lucas, J., concurring and
dissenting).
138. Id. at 899, 710 P.2d at 326-27, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 526-27 (Lucas, J., concurring and
dissenting).
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D. Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Justice Kaus
Justice Kaus stated initially that he generally concurred in Justice
Lucas' concurring and dissenting opinion.139 However, Justice Kaus fur-
ther expressed the fear that the rules laid down by the White majority
would spill over into non-insurance contractual relationships. 40 He ar-
gued that since Seaman's Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil
Co.,141 there has been great pressure on California courts to extend the
139. White v. Western Title Ins. Co., 40 Cal. 3d 870, 900, 710 P.2d 309, 327, 221 Cal. Rptr.
509, 527 (1985) (Kaus, J., concurring and dissenting).
140. Id. (Kaus, J., concurring and dissenting).
141. 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984). Seaman's Direct Buying
Service, Inc. (Seaman's) was a closely held corporation consisting of three shareholders, Id. at
759, 686 P.2d at 1160, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 356. One of Seaman's activities was the management
of a small marine fueling station. Id. In 1970, after the City of Eureka decided to modernize
the marina in which Seaman's station was located, Seaman's negotiated a dealership agreement
with Standard Oil of California (Standard). Id. In October 1972, Standard wrote Seaman's a
letter setting forth the terms of their agreement. One of the terms was that Standard would
sign a Chevron Marine Dealer agreement with Seaman's for an initial period of 10 years. Id.
at 760, 686 P.2d at 1160-61, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 356-57. The letter was accepted and agreed to
by Seaman's, and Seaman's discontinued similar negotiations with Mobil Oil Company. Id.
In 1973, as a result of the changed conditions in the oil industry, Standard adopted a" 'no
new business' policy." Id. at 760-61, 686 P.2d at 1161, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 357. During 1973,
Standard and Seaman's signed a temporary dealership agreement for the supply of fuel while
the marina was under construction. Id. The proposed marine dealership agreement contem-
plated in October 1972, however, was never signed. Id. In November 1973, a federal program
was promulgated requiring "'suppliers [of petroleum products] to supply [only] those pur-
chasers to whom they sold during [the base period of 1972].'" Id. at 761, 686 P.2d at 1161,
206 Cal. Rptr. at 357. Since Standard had not supplied products to Seaman's in 1972, Stan-
dard stated that "we will not be able to go forward with the financing we [have] been discuss-
ing." Id. Standard, however, said it would be willing to perform under the contract if
Seaman's could obtain a supply authorization from the appropriate federal agency, Standard
supplied Seaman's with the necessary forms and helped complete them. Id.
In 1974, the federal agency issued a supply order, but Standard responded by changing its
position. Id. It contended that it did not have a binding contract with Seaman's and appealed
the issuance of the supply order. Standard was successful on appeal, and internal memoranda
demonstrated Standard's reaction: "'[g]reat!i' 'We are recommending to other div[isions] that
they follow your example.'" Id.
Seaman's appealed, and the federal agency's decision was reversed. Id. "The new deci-
sion provided that an order 'direct[ing] [Standard] to fulfill supply obligations to Seaman's'
would be issued upon the filing of a copy of a court decree that a valid contract existed between
the parties under state law." Id. When Seaman's requested Standard to stipulate to the exist-
ence of a valid contract, Standard's representative replied, "'See you in court.'" Id. at 761-62,
686 P.2d at 1162, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
Seaman's then filed suit against Standard for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, among other counts. The jury returned a verdict which awarded Seaman's $397,050
in compensatory damages and $11,058,810 in punitive damages for tortious breach of the cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing. Id. at 762, 686 P.2d at 1162, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
Standard appealed.
The California Supreme Court reversed the judgment for breach of the duty of good faith
and fair dealing with directions to conduct further proceedings consistent with its opinion. Id.
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tort of breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing to other
contractual relationships. From his viewpoint, "it would be disastrous if
every contract were to be subjected to the same set of rules [the court
has] applied in the context of the insurer-insured relationship." 42 Every
person has the right to wilfully breach a contract, and Justice Kaus
stated that he could not envision that everyone in that position should be
subject to unlimited liability for punitive damages.14 3 After White, he
feared, that outcome is a grave possibility.
Recognizing that traditional contract damages are not always ade-
quate to fully compensate a plaintiff for his or her loss,'" Justice Kaus
enumerated various alternative contract remedies in lieu of damages for
bad faith breach of contract.145 For example, he first discussed the Had-
at 774, 686 P.2d at 1170, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 366. The reason for reversal was the trial court's
failure to instruct the jury that Standard's denial of the existence of the contract would not
have been tortious if made in good faith. Id. at 770, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
The court, however, found that tortious bad faith may have properly been found under Sea-
man's facts, and it discussed the extension of tortious bad faith breach of contract into rela-
tionships outside that of insurer-insured:
While the proposition that the law implies a covenant of good faith and fair
dealing in all contracts is well established, the proposition advanced by Seaman's-
that breach of the covenant always gives rise to an action in tort-is not so clear. In
holding that a tort action is available for breach of the covenant in an insurance
contract, we have emphasized the "special relationship" between insurer and in-
sured, characterized by elements of public interest, adhesion, and fiduciary responsi-
bility. No doubt there are other relationships with similar characteristics and
deserving of similar legal treatment.
When we move from such special relationships to consideration of the tort rem-
edy in the context of the ordinary commercial contract, we move into largely un-
charted and potentially dangerous waters. Here, parties of roughly equal bargaining
power are free to shape the contours of their agreement and to include provisions for
attorney fees and liquidated damages in the event of a breach. They may not be
permitted to disclaim the covenant of good faith but they are free, within reasonable
limits at least, to agree upon the standards by which application of the covenant is to
be measured. In such contracts, it may be difficult to distinguish between breach of
the covenant and breach of contract, and there is the risk that interjecting tort reme-
dies will intrude upon the expectations of the parties. This is not to say that tort
remedies have no place in such a commercial context, but that it is wise to proceed
with caution in determining their scope and application.
For the purposes of this case, it is unnecessary to decide the broad question
which Seaman's poses. Indeed, it is not even necessary to predicate liability on a
breach of the implied covenant. It is sufficient to recognize that a party to a contract
may incur tort remedies when, in addition to breaching the contract, it seeks to shield
itself from liability by denying, in bad faith and without probable cause, that the
contract exists.
Id. at 768-69, 686 P.2d at 1166-67, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362-63 (citations and footnotes omitted).
142. White, 40 Cal. 3d at 900, 710 P.2d at 327-28, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 527-28 (Kaus, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (footnote omitted).
143. Id. at 901, 710 P.2d at 328, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 528 (Kaus, J., concurring and dissenting).
144. Id. (Kaus, J., concurring and dissenting).
145. Id. at n.4, 710 P.2d at 328 n.4, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 528 n.4 (Kaus, J., concurring and
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ley v. Baxendale "'6 rule that consequential damages are limited to those
in the contemplation of the parties at the time of contract formation.'
47
Second, he referred to the denial of agreed remedies where their enforce-
ment would produce an unconscionable result."' 8 Third, he advocated
the use of prejudgment interest to compensate for loss of opportunity
even where damages are unliquidated. 149 Fourth, juries and courts could
be instructed to award higher compensatory awards to take into account
the uncertainty inherent in the law of contract damages. 5 ' Finally, he
suggested that courts could employ principles of restitution and unjust
enrichment.5 Since the bad faith/punitive damages solution was unsat-
isfactory to Justice Kaus, he did not list it among the possibilities. He
said, however, that the problem of an adequate remedy was one for the
legislature to resolve and suggested that it do something to effect a
change. 1
52
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
1. Background
The common-law duty of good faith and fair dealing is implied in all
contracts to protect the expectations of the parties to the contract.'53
dissenting) (quoting Traynor, Bad Faith Breach of a Commercial Contract: A Comment on the
Seaman's Case, 8 Bus. L. NEWS 1, 12-13 (1984)).
146. 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
147. 40 Cal. 3d at 901 n.4, 710 P.2d at 328 n.4, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 528 n.4 (Kaus, J., concur-
ring and dissenting) (quoting Traynor, Bad Faith Breach of a Commercial Contract: A Com-
ment on the Seaman's Case, 8 Bus. L. NEws 1, 12 (1984)).
148. Id. at 901-02 n.4, 710 P.2d at 328 n.4, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 528 n.4 (Kaus, J., concurring
and dissenting) (quoting Traynor, Bad Faith Breach of a Commercial Contract: A Comment
on the Seaman's Case, 8 Bus. L. NEws 1, 12-13 (1984)).
149. Id. at 902 n.4, 710 P.2d at 328 n.4, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 528 n.4 (Kaus, J., concurring and
dissenting) (quoting Traynor, Bad Faith Breach of a Commercial Contract: A Comment on the
Seaman's Case, 8 Bus. L. NEws 1, 13 (1984)).
150. Id. (Kaus, J., concurring and dissenting).
151. Id. at 902 n.4, 710 P.2d at 328 n.4, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 528 n.4 (Kaus, J., concurring and
dissenting) (quoting Traynor, Bad Faith Breach of a Commercial Contract: A Comment on the
Seaman's Case, 8 Bus. L. NEWS 1, 13 (1984)).
152. Id. at 901, 710 P.2d at 328, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 528 (Kaus, J., concurring and dissenting).
153. See 3 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 570 (Kaufman Supp. 1984).
If the purpose of contract law is to enforce the reasonable expectations of parties
induced by promises, then at some point it becomes necessary for courts to look to
the substance rather than to the form of the agreement, and to hold that substance
controls over form. What courts are doing here, whether calling the process "impli-
cation" of promises, or interpreting the requirements of "good faith," as the current
fashion may be, is but a recognition that the parties occasionally have understandings
or expectations that were so fundamental that they did not need to negotiate about
those expectations. When the court "implies a promise" or holds that "good faith"
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This implied covenant requires the performance of any condition that is
necessary to another's performance of the agreement. 154 One commenta-
tor has stated that "[i]f the cooperation of the other party is necessary for
successful performance of an obligation, a promise to give that coopera-
tion and not to do anything which prevents realization of the fruits of per-
formance, will often be implied." 155  One case, Harm v. Frasher,
1 56
requires a party not to violate those expectations, it is recognizing that sometimes
silence says more than words, and it is understanding its duty to the spirit of the
bargain is higher than its duty to the technicalities of the language.
Id.
154. Id.
155. 1 B.E. WITrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW § 576 (1973) (emphasis in original).
156. 181 Cal. App. 2d 405, 5 Cal. Rptr. 367 (1960). Hattie Harm and the Estate of Harold
B. Frasher (Frasher Estate), acting through executors, were copartners engaged in an inte-
grated trucking business. Id. at 410, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 370. Hattie Harm, individually and as
trustee of the George Robert Harm Trust (Harm Interests), owned capital stock in two corpo-
rations. Id. The Frasher Estate also owned stock in those corporations. In July 1951, repre-
sentatives of the Harm Interests and the Frasher Estate met with representatives of
Consolidated Copperstate Lines (Copperstate) to negotiate the terms of an agreement whereby
the Harm Interests and the Frasher Estate would sell their partnership and respective corpo-
rate shares to Copperstate. The parties simultaneously executed three instruments. One
agreement was between Copperstate and the Harm Interests; another was between Copperstate
and the Frasher Estate. Both were for the sale of the corporate stock. The third agreement
was between Copperstate, Hattie Harm and the Frasher Estate for the sale of the partnership
business. Each agreement referred to the others, and each was contingent on the others' con-
current closing. Id. After all the agreed conditions precedent occurred, Copperstate tendered
performance. The Frasher Estate, however, refused to perform. Although the Harm Interests
indicated their willingness and intention to perform, Copperstate required performance by all
parties and refused to perform. Copperstate subsequently brought an action and was awarded
specific performance of the contracts. Accordingly, the sales were consummated on August 7,
1956.
The Harm Interests claimed damage due to the Frasher Estate's delay in performance
from the time that Copperstate initially tendered performance on September 1, 1954, to the
consummation of the sale in 1956. After a trial on breach of the agreement between the Harm
Interests and the Frasher Estate, the court concluded "that the agreement to sell was one
transaction which was expressed in three written contracts, mutually integrated and interde-
pendent." Id. at 412, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 371. The trial court found for the Harm Interests.
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment. Id. at 424, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 379. In
doing so, it discussed the duty of good faith and fair dealing. The court stated:
In refusing to complete the sale on September 1, 1954, the executors of the
"Frasher Estate" breached the foregoing duty which they owed the "Harm Inter-
ests" under the contract of sale evidenced by the three agreements heretofore consid-
ered.
Defendants contend that the complaint does not allege any promise by the
"Frasher Estate" to the "Harm Interests." Such an allegation was unnecessary to
the statement of a cause of action. The complaint alleged the execution of the three
agreements as part of one transaction, incorporated the provisions thereof by refer-
ence, and attached them thereto as exhibits. From such allegations the existence of
the implied covenants heretofore considered is established as a matter of law. The
record plainly indicates that all parties to the action were fully aware of their respec-
tive contentions. The defendant's objection to the pleading is without merit.
Id. at 417, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 374-75.
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expanded on this concept and stated:
This covenant not only imposes upon each contracting party
the duty to refrain from doing anything which would render
performance of the contract impossible by any act of his own,
but also the duty to do everything that the contract presupposes
that he will do to accomplish its purpose.'57
In California, this bilateral obligation is implied in all contracts, includ-
ing insurance contracts."5 8
Implicit in the holdings of cases imposing upon insurers a duty of
good faith and fair dealing is the rationale that insurance companies
should act fairly and promptly on the claims of their insureds.' 5 9 Two
sub-duties have evolved from case law regarding the broader duty of
good faith and fair dealing.
The first is the duty to conduct good faith settlement negotiations.
60
For example, in Crisci v. Security Insurance Co., 1 61 the supreme court
held that "recovery may be based on unwarranted rejection of a reason-
able settlement offer"' 62 regardless of the absence of dishonesty or
fraud. 161 In Crisci, one of Mrs. Crisci's tenants fell down a wooden stair-
case in her apartment building when a tread gave way. 64 Mrs. Crisci's
insurer suspected that a $100,000 verdict might be returned if the jury
believed the tenant's claim that the fall triggered her psychosis. 65 Nev-
ertheless, the insurer refused the tenant's offer to settle for $10,000, Mrs.
Crisci's policy limit. 166 As expected, the tenant was awarded $101,000 at
trial.'6 7 Consequently, Mrs. Crisci was forced to settle with the victim
for the excess over her policy limit.168 As a result, Mrs. Crisci became
indigent, suffered mental distress and attempted suicide.' 69 She subse-
quently brought an action against her insurance company for breach of
157. Id. at 417, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 374.
158. Brown v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. 2d 559, 564, 212 P.2d 878, 881 (1949).
159. See, e.g., Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr.
480 (1973); Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967);
Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958); Fletcher v. West-
ern Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970).
160. See Comment, Extending the Insurer's Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing to Third
Parties under Liability Insurance Policies, 25 UCLA L. REv. 1413, 1413 (1978).
161. 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
162. Id. at 430, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 427, 426 P.2d at 175, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 15.
165. Id. at 428, 426 P.2d at 175, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 15.
166. Id.
167. Id. The jury awarded $100,000 to Mrs. Crisci and $1000 to her husband.
168. Id. at 429, 426 P.2d at 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16.
169. Id.
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the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.1 70 Mrs. Crisci was
awarded $91,000 for compensatory damages and $25,000 for emotional
distress.'71 By its decision, the California Supreme Court seemed to no-
tify all insurers that they should conduct settlement negotiations in good
faith. Without good faith negotiations, Mrs. Crisci was denied the "co-
operation of the other party [to the insurance contract]... necessary for
successful performance of an obligation."
17 2
The second sub-duty evolving from case law is the duty to promptly
deliver the insurance policy benefits to the insured.173 Gruenberg v.
Aetna Insurance Co. 174 illustrates this point. Gruenberg, the owner of a
business, the premises of which were damaged by fire, alleged that the
insurer schemed to deprive him of the benefits due under a fire insurance
policy. 7 He claimed that the insurer encouraged criminal charges
against him by falsely implying that he had a motive to commit arson.
176
The insurers knew that while criminal charges were pending against
Gruenberg, he could not appear for an examination concerning the loss
as required by his policy, and the insurer used this failure to appear as a
pretense for denying liability under the policy. 177 The trial court sus-
tained a general demurrer.178 Finding that Gruenberg had stated a cause
of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing, the supreme court reversed.'79 In this instance, the court sought to
protect vulnerable insureds from insurers' bad faith tactics.
The two sub-duties mentioned above are significant since both are
relevant to the issues in White v. Western Title Insurance Co.180 The
duty to effectuate good faith settlement negotiations is patently obvious
in White. The Whites attempted to and were successful at admitting set-
tlement negotiations into evidence to prove Western Title's bad faith.
The duty to promptly deliver insurance policy benefits, however, is less
obvious in the context of White. Nonetheless, it is present since the
Whites alleged that Western Title attempted to delay delivery of policy
benefits through its conduct in litigation. Accordingly, the Whites suc-
170. Id.
171. Id. at 427, 426 P.2d at 175, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 15.
172. See supra text accompanying note 155. See also 1 B.E. WITKIN, supra note 155, at
§ 576.
173. See Comment, supra note 160, at 1413.
174. 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973).
175. Id. at 570, 571, 510 P.2d at 1034, 1035, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 482, 483.
176. Id. at 571, 510 P.2d at 1035, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 483.
177. Id. at 571-72, 510 P.2d at 1035, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 483.
178. Id. at 569, 510 P.2d at 1034, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 482.
179. Id. at 581, 510 P.2d at 1042, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
180. 40 Cal. 3d 870, 710 P.2d 309, 221 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1985).
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cessfully admitted into evidence Western Title's trial conduct to prove
undue delay in the provision of policy benefits.
The duty of good faith and fair dealing, it would appear, includes
the insurer's duty to conduct an adequate and timely investigation of the
insured's claim18' and the ubiquitous duty to defend the insured.' 82 The
White court correctly assumed that all of these obligations were imposed
by the nature of contractual relationship between Western Title and the
Whites. However, the court was faced with the question of whether an
insurer owes an insured a duty of good faith and fair dealing after the
insured has commenced litigation against the insurer. The White court
answered that question in the affirmative.
2. Continuation of the duty of good faith and fair dealing
The White v. Western Title Insurance Co.'83 court's holding that the
duty of good faith and fair dealing184 extends until after the commence-
ment of litigation is subject to criticism and debate. Once an action for
breach of contract is filed,185 both performance of the contract and coop-
eration between the parties have been frustrated. This consequence is
181. Cf. Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78
(1970).
182, California courts have broadly interpreted an insurer's duty to defend. In St. Paul Fire
& Marine Ins. Co. v. Sears Roebuck & Co., the United States Court of Appeals, applying
California law, held that the duty to defend under a policy of liability insurance is broader than
the duty to indemnify. 603 F.2d 780, 786 (9th Cir. 1979). See also Eichler Homes, Inc. v.
Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 238 Cal. App. 2d 532, 47 Cal. Rptr. 843 (1965) and Karpe
v. Great Am. Indem. Co., 190 Cal. App. 2d 226, 11 Cal. Rptr. 908 (1961). Thus, although an
insurer may not be obligated to indemnify an insured for damage or loss, it may owe the
insured a defense.
Once a plaintiff raises allegations which potentially fall within the coverage provided the
insured, the insurer is obligated to defend its insured fully. See Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65
Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966). The insurer must defend an entire action
even if fewer than all the claims against the insured are covered by the policy. See Hogan v.
Midland Nat'l Ins. Co., 3 Cal. 3d 553, 476 P.2d 825, 91 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1970). Consequently,
if even one of the causes of action against the insured is potentially covered by the insurance
policy, then the insurer must defend the entire lawsuit.
Furthermore, California law requires that "[w]here there is doubt as to whether the duty
to defend exists, doubt should be resolved in favor of the insured and against the insurer."
EichlerHomes, 238 Cal. App. 2d at 538, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 847. Ifan insurer wrongfully refuses
to defend an insured and a judgment is rendered against the insured, the insurer loses its right
to assert any defenses to the insured's claim and must pay the entire amount of the judgment
or settlement even if it exceeds the insured's policy limits. See Betts v. Allstate Ins. Co., 154
Cal. App. 3d 688, 201 Cal. Rptr. 528 (1984).
183. 40 Cal. 3d 870, 710 P.2d 309, 221 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1985).
184. See supra text accompanying notes 153-57 & note 153.
185. No action for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing exists without a breach
of contract. Of course, however, it is possible to allege breach of contract without alleging a
count for breach of the duty of good faith.
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true with respect to all breaches-whether total or partial. In the case of
a total breach, performance of the contract has prematurely terminated
or has been materially defective in some manner. 186 In other words, one
or both parties to the contract are non-cooperative. In the case of a par-
tial breach, performance continues despite some immaterial defect' 87 and
despite a lack of cooperation between the parties with respect to the par-
ticular defective performance. 18 8 In both situations, one of the parties to
the contract has breached the implied promise to cooperate. 18 9 Since the
parties are aligned in this position of non-cooperation, it would be illogi-
cal to impose the duty to cooperate or "the duty to do everything that the
contract presupposes that [the party] will do to accomplish its pur-
pose"' 90 after a party has instituted an action for breach of contract.
This concept is equally applicable in the insurance contract context.
In Frommoethelydo v. Fire Insurance Exchange,19' the California
Supreme Court defined the covenant of good faith and fair dealing as
186. 4 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 946 (1951).
187. Id.
188. In finding that the duty of good faith and fair dealing continues after the commence-
ment of litigation, the majority in White reasoned that the underlying contractual relationship
did not terminate when a lawsuit was filed. Demonstrating this principle, the court analogized
to an automobile liability policy where an insurer would have a continuing duty of good faith
and fair dealing to an insured in the event that the insured was involved in a subsequent car
accident. White, 40 Cal. 3d at 885, 710 P.2d at 317, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 517. The insurer would
have to provide policy benefits to the insured necessary to protect him or her against a related
suit.
As Justice Lucas related in his dissent, the majority focused on the wrong issue. Rather,
it should have focused on the "nature of the relationship between the parties as to the particu-
lar claim at issue." Id. at 892, 710 P.2d at 322, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 522 (Lucas, J., concurring
and dissenting) (emphasis in original). In the insurance contract context where the payments
of benefits are made upon the occurrence of a contingency, each covered event gives rise to a
separate transaction. Although a continuing contractual relationship exists between the in-
surer and the insured, they are in an adversarial situation with respect to the particular claim
being litigated. Once the contingency has occurred, a fundamental shift in the parties' rela-
tionship results. No longer do the insured and insurer work toward a common goal-the
mutually satisfactory fruition of bargained-for benefits-rather, they seek to protect their own
interests at the expense of the other.
189. See supra text accompanying note 186.
190. See supra text accompanying note 188.
191. 42 Cal. 3d 208, 721 P.2d 41, 228 Cal. Rptr. 160 (1986). In Frommoethelydo, Clydelho
Frommoethelydo was insured by defendant Fire Insurance Exchange under a homeowner's
policy. In August 1978, Frommoethelydo's house was burglarized. After submitting a claim
to the insurer, his claim was settled for $10,784. Id. at 212, 721 P.2d at 42, 228 Cal. Rptr. at
161. Frommoethelydo's house was burglarized again in June 1979, and he filed a claim with
Fire Insurance Exchange for an aggregate loss of $8871, including $3000 for stereo and video
equipment. Id. To his sworn statement, he attached a copy of a bill of sale which had been
altered so that the date of equipment purchase appeared to be before the date of the second
theft. The date on the receipt had been stenciled over to read "1/03/79." When the insurer
investigated the possiblity of fraud, it discovered that the purported store of sale had no record
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implied in insurance contracts. It stated that "[t]o fulfill its implied obli-
gation, an insurer must give at least as much consideration to the inter-
ests of the insured as it gives to its own interests."1 92 This statement
surely applies to situations where the insurer must decide whether to set-
tle or litigate a third party claim against the insured, or whether to rea-
sonably withhold payment of the claim of its insured. Once an insured
has set in motion the wheels of litigation against its insurer, it would be
an unreasonable, if not impossible, requirement for an insurer to both
defend itself and protect the interests of its adversary, the insured. Im-
posing the duty of good faith and fair dealing after the commencement of
an action would be to obligate the insurer to provide protection to the
insured during trial. Under this perspective, the insurer would have to
disclose to the insured all evidence detrimental to the insurer's case.1
93
of Frommoethelydo's purchase in January 1979. The store did, however, have receipts dated
before the first burglary and after the second. Id.
Although Frommoethelydo insisted he had purchased equipment at that store on three
different occasions, Fire Insurance Exchange reported him to the Bureau of Fraudulent Claims
for insurance fraud. Accordingly, the Bureau instituted criminal proceedings against From-
moethelydo. Id. at 212-13, 721 P.2d at 43, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 162. Frommoethelydo's attorney
was able to convince the district attorney "that the latter could not prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the claim, as opposed to the receipt, was false." Id. at 213, 721 P.2d at 43, 228 Cal,
Rptr. at 162. On the morning of trial, the district attorney dismissed the criminal charges. Id.
The basis for dismissal was that Frommoethelydo had witnesses who would testify to seeing
large quantities of stereo and video equipment in his house prior to the second theft and that
false documentation of a valid claim was not a violation of section 556 of the California Insur-
ance Code. Id. See CAL. INS. CODE § 556(a)(1) (West Supp. 1987) ("It is unlawful to: (1)
Knowingly present or cause to be presented any false or fraudulent claim for the payment of a
loss ... under a contract of insurance.").
After dismissal, Frommoethelydo's attorney offered to compromise the insurance claim
by waiving the disputed $3000. 42 Cal. 3d at 214, 721 P.2d at 44, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 163.
Without further investigating the claim, the insurer rejected the compromise "on the ground
that a material misrepresentation in a claim justifies rescission of the entire policy." Id. The
insurer so concluded in light of its newly acquired knowledge of Frommoethelydo's witnesses.
Frommoethelydo filed a lawsuit for, among other things, breach of the duty of good faith
and fair dealing. The jury awarded him $8871, the amount of his original claim, plus $250,000
for emotional distress and $1,250,000 for punitive damages. Id. The California Supreme
Court reversed the awards for emotional distress and punitive damages, but upheld the award
for economic loss. Id. at 220, 721 P.2d at 48, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 167. The court stated that
"[b]y awarding damages for economic loss, the jury obviously determined that plaintiff had
suffered the loss." Id. Additionally, the court found that the insurer had breached its duty to
investigate after it was apprised of the existence of Frommoethelydo's witnesses and decided
that he should be permitted to seek a further trial to recover those damages. Id.
192. Frommoethelydo, 42 Cal. 3d at 214, 721 P.2d at 44, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 163,
193. White, 40 Cal. 3d at 886, 710 P.2d at 317, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 517 (1985). In San Diego
Navy Federal Credit Union v. Cumis Insurance Society, Inc., 162 Cal. App. 3d 358, 208 Cal.
Rptr. 494 (1984), the California Court of Appeal attempted to resolve these types of conflicts
within the declaratory relief setting. The typical scenario is: the insured files a claim for loss,
the insurer denies coverage subject to a reservation of rights, the insured files a lawsuit against
the insurer, and the insurer cross-complains for a declaratory judgment that coverage does not
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Additionally, any typical trial conduct might be paraded in front of a
jury to evidence an attempt to unduly delay payment of the insured's
claim. An insurer, consequently, might be adjudged acting in bad faith
merely because it seeks to take a deposition. White effectively denies the
insurer the right to defend itself vigorously. 194 Moreover, this reasoning
certainly places the insurer's defense attorney in a precarious position.
195
a. denial of the insurer's 'fundamental right"'96 to defend itself
Since the insurer's routine trial conduct may be viewed as acts of
bad faith by an uninformed jury, an insurer may well be prejudiced when
the jury interprets that conduct. In White v. Western Title Insurance
Co.,197 the court permitted the jury to hear evidence of Western Title's
unsuccessful motion for summary judgment as well as evidence regarding
exist under the insured's policy. In that setting, Cumis mandates that an insurer pay for in-
dependent counsel for the insured, id. at 361, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 496, and surrender control of
the insured's defense to that independent counsel. Id. at 375, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 506. Of course,
this situation might occur during the pendency of a third party action against the insured. The
insurer, consequently, would be defending the third party action while providing independent
counsel for the insured in the declaratory relief action.
However, in actual practice, Cumis has created, rather than alleviated, many conflicts and
problems between the various attorneys, the parties to the actions, and any combination of
those categories. A discussion of those conflicts could be the topic of numerous law review
articles.
194. In White, the court stated:
[I]t is not unusual for an insurance company to provide policy benefits, such as the
defense of litigation, while itself instituting suit to determine whether and to what
extent it must provide those benefits. It could not reasonably be argued under such
circumstances either that the insurer no longer owes any contractual duties to the
insured, or that it need not perform those duties fairly and in good faith.
White, 40 Cal. 3d at 885-86, 710 P.2d at 317, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 517.
Undisputably, the insurer owes the insured the duty "not to do anything which prevents
realization of the fruits of [their agreement]" regarding defense of the third party claim against
the insured. Some may wish, however, to extend the court's reasoning to reach an absurd
result. At one point in its discussion, the court stated, "obviously the insurer could not be
permitted to terminate its own obligations by initiating litigation .... Id. at 886, 710 P.2d at
317, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 517; see also supra note 155 and accompanying text. This dicta seems to
indicate that the insurer owes the insured the duty of good faith and fair dealing in both the
third party suit and the suit for declaratory relief. The very institution of the declaratory relief
action, consequently, could be said to prevent or delay realization of contract benefits, and the
insurer's attempt to determine those benefits would itself be an act of bad faith.
195. See infra notes 210-19 and accompanying text.
196. Without giving any support, Justice Lucas stated that "[t]he majority here does not
give any reasoned consideration to this fundamental and recognized right to defend." White,
40 Cal. 3d at 896, 710 P.2d at 324, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 524 (Lucas, J., concurring and dissenting)
(emphasis added). He also discussed this "fundamental right" in various other places in his
argument. See, eg., id. at 896 n.5, 710 P.2d at 324 n.5, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 524 n.5 (Lucas, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
197. 40 Cal. 3d 870, 710 P.2d 309, 221 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1985).
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the negotiations and conduct of its attorneys. 198 Additionally, the in-
sured's attorney presented this evidence without any suggestion "that the
particular tactics used were in and of themselves improper; rather the
implicit claim was that the normal delays of litigation themselves
amounted to evidence of a lack of good faith."' 9 9 The jury nevertheless
decided that Western Title was liable for tortious bad faith breach of
contract.
The problems associated with allowing juries to hear this type of
evidence are twofold. First, juries largely comprise lay people who are
not familiar with litigation strategies and tactics. Second, since no show-
ing of malice is required to prove bad faith,2" this evidence is often suffi-
cient in and of itself to prove the elements of the tort.
A jury comprising people without legal backgrounds is unlikely to
discern the difference between bad faith conduct and trial strategy. In a
lay jury's eyes, a normal delay may evince an insurer's lack of good faith.
The White court, however, "trust[ed] that the jurors [would] be aware
that parties to a lawsuit are adversaries, and [would] evaluate the in-
surer's conduct in relation to that setting."2"1 But the White jury obvi-
ously did not live up to the court's expectations since it interpreted
evidence of depositions, numerous files and briefs,20 and a motion for
summary judgment 20 3 as bad faith conduct.
Paradoxically, the White court determined that the law provides ad-
equate procedural safeguards to prevent this type of prejudicial effect. In
referring to section 352 of the California Evidence Code,2" it declared
198. In his closing argument, White's attorney informed the jury that:
The other aspect of this case is that you have a situation where they have delayed the
case, you've seen the files that we've been dragging around .... [O]nce a suit is filed
then every movement from one side produces an equal and opposite movement in the
other direction, and you end up with these numerous briefs. Briefs on that, briefs on
this, research depositions, there were eight or nine depositions taken in this case.
Most of which were unnecessary but once somebody takes some information you've
got to do the same thing to prepare for trial.
Id. at 895 n.4, 710 P.2d at 323 n.4, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 523 n.4 (Lucas, J., concurring and
dissenting). It is interesting to note that if an insurer is found liable for breach of the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing as a result of its "bad faith" conduct during litigation, the insurer
could then sue its attorney for malpractice since counsel usually determines trial strategy.
199. Id. (Lucas, J., concurring and dissenting).
200. See supra note 116.
201. White, 40 Cal. 3d at 886, 710 P.2d at 317, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 517.
202. See supra note 198.
203. See supra text accompanying note 198.
204. Section 352 provides in pertinent part: "The court in its discretion may exclude evi-
dence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission
will ... create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading
the jury." CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 1966).
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that "[t]he trial court... would retain the authority to exclude evidence
of settlement offers or other conduct of the insurer if it concluded that
• .. the prejudicial effect of such evidence would outweigh its probative
value."2" 5 However, the court gave no guidelines to lower courts as to
how they should determine whether prejudice outweighs probative value
in this type of situation." 6 This lack of guidelines destroys the defend-
ant's procedural safeguards because the court's rule is difficult to apply.
Moreover, since proof of bad faith conduct does not require the existence
of malice,20 7 it is difficult to perceive any factual setting where this type
of evidence would be more probative than prejudicial. For example, a
lay jury could interpret an insurer's refusal to settle subsequent to the
denial of a motion for summary judgment as conduct which contravenes
the duty of good faith and fair dealing. 08 Further, by the White court's
rule, a trial court need not even consider whether the insurer proceeded
with malicious or immoral intent. The conduct alone provides the basis
of liability. In contrast, if proof of malice were a requirement, it would be
infinitely more difficult to prove that a party's unsuccessful motion for
summary judgment, or its taking of depositions, was evidence of bad
faith conduct. Rather, the jury would be in a better position to under-
stand that these actions are commonplace in litigation. Since the jury
does not have this background, the admission of evidence of ordinary
trial conduct is more prejudicial than probative.20 9
205. White, 40 Cal. 3d at 887 n.9, 710 P.2d at 317 n.9, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 517 n.9.
206. See infra note 209.
207. See supra note 116.
208. In White, "no flagrant misconduct was alleged and plaintiff's argument regarding de-
fendant's litigation conduct [could] be characterized as asserting only that litigation generally
caused delay." 40 Cal. 3d at 898 n.7, 710 P.2d at 325 n.7, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 525 n.7 (Lucas, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
209. Even if evidence of trial conduct is found to be more probative than prejudicial, a trial
court's exercise of discretion still does not cure the insurer's basic problems. Justice Lucas
stated that:
Insurers are still left uncertain as to whether any action they take with regard to
litigation on an underlying breach of contract claim may be used against them.
There is no lessening of the basic constraints on a defendant's right to defend by
virtue of a rule which says the trial court has discretion to decide what may be
introduced.
Id. at 897 n.7, 710 P.2d at 325 n.7, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 525 n.7 (Lucas, J., concurring and
dissenting).
Although the White court summarily discussed this balancing of interests in connection
with admission of evidence of litigation conduct, it admitted evidence of Western Title's settle-
ment offers made during trial without attempting to apply section 352 of the California Evi-
dence Code. Id. (Lucas, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Lucas concluded that "[a]s a
result, it is difficult to see when a trial court will ever exclude such evidence following this
decision." Id. at 898 n.7, 710 P.2d at 325 n.7, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 525 n.7 (Lucas, J., concurring
and dissenting).
430 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:399
After White, not only may an insurer's defensive conduct be prejudi-
cially misunderstood by juries, but insurers may also be effectively denied
the right to defend themselves because of their lawyers' ethical
considerations.
b. the continuation of good faith and fair dealing and lawyers' ethics
The majority in White v. Western Title Insurance Co.210 gave little
attention to the insurer's argument that its defense would be impeded by
the court's rule-that the duty of good faith and fair dealing continues
during litigation. One of Western Title's contentions was that it would
be subject to hardship since "the attorney who prepare[d] the case for
trial could not conduct the trial because he would be a critical witness to
the insurer's good faith during the pretrial period." 21' In response, the
court answered:
The issue of contractual liability can be tried separately, and
prior to the trial on the good faith claim, as was done in the
present case. In any event, what constitutes good faith and fair
dealing depends on the circumstances of each case, including
the stage of the proceedings and the posture of the parties.21 2
In making this statement, the majority failed to analyze the signifi-
cant prohibitions of the California Rules of Professional Conduct213 (Cal-
ifornia Rules). Under the California Rules, an attorney must withdraw
from employment if his or her testimony may be prejudicial to the cli-
ent.214 Consequently, if the insurer's attorney who prepared the case for
210. 40 Cal. 3d 870, 710 P.2d 309, 221 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1985).
211. Id. at 886, 710 P.2d at 317, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 517. For a discussion of the attorney-
witness dilemma, see Ashley, The Problem ofAttorney- Witness in Bad Faith Cases, BAD FAITH
L. REP. 51 (1987).
212. White, 40 Cal. 3d at 886, 710 P.2d at 317, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 517.
213. Interestingly, the California Rules of Professional Conduct are approved and enforced
by the California Supreme Court. See CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
1-100 (1983).
214. See id. Rules 2-111(A)(5) & 2-110(B)(2). Those rules state:
If, after undertaking employment in contemplated or pending litigation, a mem-
ber of the State Bar learns or it is obvious that he ora lawyer in hisfirm may be called
as a witness other than on behalf of his client, he may continue the representation
until it is apparent that his testimony is or may be prejudicial to his client.
Id. Rule 2-11I1(A)(5) (emphasis added).
A member of the State Bar representing a client before a tribunal .... shall
withdraw from employment, and a member of the State Bar representing a client in
other matters shall withdraw from employment, if:
He knows or should know that his continued employment will result in violation
of these Rules of Professional Conduct or of the State Bar Act ....
Id. Rule 2-111 (B)(2) (emphasis added).
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trial is required to testify against the insurer as to bad faith in trial prepa-
ration or procedure, then the attorney must withdraw from employ-
ment.21 5 The strict mandate of the California Rules renders the
majority's distinction valueless.
Furthermore, the attorney's possible mandatory withdrawal from
employment works a hardship on both the insurer and its attorney. The
insurer may be harmed because its attorney may be reluctant to advise
his or her client on issues of settlement or litigation strategy. The attor-
ney may act in such a manner out of fear of being called to testify about
those issues. Since that testimony might be prejudicial to the client, the
attorney might be forced to withdraw from employment.216 The insurer,
consequently, would be compelled to seek new counsel who would be
unfamiliar with the case. Moreover, if called to testify, the attorney
would be forced, in many instances, to assert the attorney-client privi-
lege.217 The invocation of this privilege might lead a lay jury to believe
that the insurer's attorney is hiding something-the insurer's bad faith
215. In a bifurcated trial situation such as White-where the issues of liability and bad faith
are tried separately-the result would be the same. The insurer's attorney, however, would be
able to try the issue of liability. On the other hand, the attorney would be precluded under the
California Rules from trying the subsequent bad faith trial if called as a material witness.
An informal opinion of the Los Angeles County Bar Association Legal Ethics Committee
stated:
The question whether the attorney should withdraw and serve only as a witness,
depends on the facts in each case. Unless there are specific facts which patently
indicate that... withdrawal by the attorney would work a substantial hardship on
the client, resulting in the personal or financial sacrifice of the client, [previous] opin-
ions indicate that the attorney ... should withdraw.
L.A. County Bar Ass'n Comm. on Legal Ethics, Informal Op. 1970-13 (1970).
The Committee based its opinion on the following facts: The attorney for an estate had
prepared the testator's will and was also one of the attesting witnesses. One of the decedent's
relatives contested the will "'on the grounds of undue influence, improper execution, etc.'"
Id. Since the attorney's testimony was critical as to circumstances surrounding the making of
the will, the question was whether he could ethically testify and represent the estate. The
Committee concluded that the attorney should withdraw and testify.
The Committee did not define "substantial hardship." It did, however, adopt a portion of
the Model Code of Professional Responsibility (Model Code). That portion provides that
mandatory withdrawal may be disregarded "if [withdrawal] would work a substantial hardship
on the client because of the distinctive value of the lawyer or his firm as counsel in the particu-
lar case." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY DR 5-101(B)(4) (1981). That
general rule also provides that an attorney need not withdraw if the testimony relates to an
uncontested or immaterial matter. Id. DR 5-101(B)(l)-(3). Furthermore, "[w]here the ques-
tion arises, doubts should be resolved in favor of the lawyer testifying and against his ...
continuing as an advocate." Id. EC 5-10. In all other circumstances when testimony is re-
quired as to a material fact, withdrawal is mandatory. Id. DR 5-102. When these standards
are applied to the insurance context, it seems, mandatory withdrawal will trump almost any
consideration.
216. See supra note 214.
217. Pursuant to the attorney-client privilege, an attorney may not divulge to any tribunal
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conduct-when in fact there may have been no bad faith whatsoever.
For these reasons, attorneys might refrain from advocating the insurer's
position as zealously as they otherwise might, thus undermining the ad-
versarial system.
The attorney might also be harmed because withdrawal may mean
the loss of necessary financial support. A sole practitioner, a small law
firm, or even a large firm may lose a substantial portion of their income
simply because that sole practitioner or member of the firm is called to
testify regarding a material fact. If a member of a firm must testify, then
under the California Rules the entire firm must withdraw from
employment.
218
any confidential information communicated between the attorney and the client unless author-
ized to do so by the holder of the privilege, usually the client or the client's representative.
Section 952 of the California Evidence Code states:
"[Confidential communication between client and lawyer" means information trans-
mitted between a client and his lawyer in the course of that relationship and in confi-
dence by a means which, so far as the client is aware, discloses the information to no
third persons other than those who are present to further the interest of the client in
consultation or those to whom disclosure is reasonably necessary for the transmission
of the inforniation or the accomplishment of the purpose for which the lawyer is
consulted, and includes a legal opinion formed and the advice given by the lawyer in
the course of that relationship.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 952 (West Supp. 1987) (emphasis added). Accordingly, advice given by
the attorney to the insurer regarding trial strategy or settlement procedures is included in the
definition of "confidential communication between client and lawyer." The attorney may,
however, disclose such information if the client waives the privilege and permits the attorney
to reveal the confidential information: "Subject to [waiver of the privilege] ... the client,
whether or not a party, has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another from
disclosing, a confidential communication between client and lawyer ..... " CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 954 (West Supp. 1987). Generally, clients do not want any of their confidences disclosed
because once some information is volunteered, then the privilege may be deemed waived. Con-
sequently, other confidential information which may be prejudicial to the client may also be
subject to waiver and placed in issue. Section 912(a) of the California Evidence Code states:
[T]he right of any person to claim a privilege provided by Section 954 (lawyer-client
privilege).., is waived with respect to a communication protected by such privilege
if any holder of the privilege, without coercion, has disclosed a significant part of the
communication or has consented to such disclosure made by anyone. Consent to
disclosure is manifested by any statement or other conduct of the holder of the privi-
lege indicating consent to the disclosure, including failure to claim the privilege in
any proceeding in which the holder has the legal standing and opportunity to claim
the privilege.
CAL, EVID. CODE § 912(a) (West Supp. 1987).
218. See L.A. County Bar Ass'n Comm. on Legal Ethics, Informal Op. 1970-13 (1970).
There, the Committee adopted the viewpoint of the American Bar Association which "ex-
pressed the view that if the testimony of a partner would be material in sustaining the will, the
firm could not represent the proponent in the will contest." Id. (citing ABA Comm. on Pro-
fessional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 50 (1931)). See also MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL REsPONSIBILITy DR 5-105(D) (1986) which states that "[i]f a lawyer is required to
decline employment or to withdraw from employment under a Disciplinary Rule, no partner
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c. defense of the continuing duty of good faith and fair dealing
There are several strategies which insurers can utilize to defend
against alleged breaches of the continuing duty of good faith and fair
dealing. An insurance company may choose to cancel or decline to re-
or associate, or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm may accept or continue such
employment."
The California Rules do not speak to this proposition. However, since California adopted
the Model Code, it follows that one must analogize to the Model Code in order to determine
California law. Cf. L.A. County Bar Ass'n Comm. on Legal Ethics, Informal Op. 1970-13
(1970) (Committee analogized to Model Code because of absence of parallel provisions in Cali-
fornia Rules). One California Supreme Court case, Comden v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 906,
576 P.2d 971, 145 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1978), analogized to the Model Code under similar circum-
stances and disqualified an entire law firm. In Comden, plaintiffs had retained a senior partner
of a law firm to represent them in their continuing business activities. A contract dispute
subsequently arose between plaintiffs and defendant. After unsuccessful negotiations, plaintiffs
filed a complaint for injunctive relief through another attorney in the firm. In support of
plaintiffs' application for preliminary injunction, the nonlitigating attorney filed a declaration
detailing his negotiations with representatives of defendant and declaring that he had heard
statements which established a breach of contract by defendant. Id. at 912, 576 P.2d at 973,
145 Cal. Rptr. at 11.
At the hearing for preliminary injunction, defendant moved to disqualify plaintiffs' law
firm since members of the firm who had made declarations were likely to testify at trial. The
trial court granted the motion and the supreme court affirmed. Id. at 910-11, 576 P.2d at 972,
145 Cal. Rptr. at 10.
In affirming withdrawal, the court reasoned:
An examination of the purposes underlying rule 2-111(A)(4) supports the
court's ruling. An attorney who attempts to be both advocate and witness impairs
his credibility as witness and diminishes his effectiveness as advocate. While the
harm recedes when the attorney-witness is not himself trial counsel but only a mem-
ber of trial counsel's firm, the opportunity still exists for opposing counsel to argue
the attorney-witness' stake in the litigation through his law firm influences his objec-
tivity. (See ABA Code of Prof. Responsibility, EC 5-9.)
Comden, 20 Cal. 3d at 912, 576 P.2d at 973, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 11. The court concluded that
although plaintiffs might be inconvenienced by withdrawal of the law firm, inconvenience falls
short of the California Rule's substantial hardship exception. Id. at 914, 576 P.2d at 974, 145
Cal. Rptr. at 12. To the contrary, the court stated that the firm's withdrawal would enhance
plaintiffs' attorney's usefulness as a witness since the attorney would not be vulnerable to im-
peachment for interest. Id. The court then ruled:
When trial counsel foresees the possiblity his continued representation of a cli-
ent may fall within the prohibition of rule 2-111 (A)(4) because he or a member of his
firm ought to testify on behalf of such client at trial, he should resolve any doubt in
favor of preserving the integrity of his testimony and against his continued participa-
tion as trial counsel. (See ABA Code of Prof. Responsibility, EC 5-10.)
Camden, 20 Cal. 3d at 915, 576 P.2d at 975, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 13. Therefore, it seems, a
California law firm must withdraw from employment whenever a partner or associate is called
to give any type of substantive testimony about one of its clients whether or not the testimony
is prejudicial.
For other cases which have relied on the Model Code to impute disqualification, see Wil-
liam H. Raley Co. v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d 1042, 197 Cal. Rptr. 232 (1983) and
Chambers v. Superior Court, 121 Cal. App. 3d 893, 175 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1981).
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new an insured's policy, allege comparative bad faith or, if available, as-
sert a statute of limitations defense.
First, an insurance company either may decline to renew an in-
sured's policy or it may cancel an insured who indicates substantial
risk.2 19 If the insurance policy were cancelled or not renewed before
trial, then the White court's reasoning, arguably, would not apply. The
court held that because an insurer would be obligated to provide an in-
sured with contract benefits if the insured were involved in a second au-
tomobile accident, the insurer was equally obligated to provide those
219. Title insurers, however, would not be able to benefit under this proposition since a one-
time premium insures the property for the duration of the insured's ownership. Other types of
insurance carriers would be able to benefit as long as their contracts contained provisions for
non renewal or cancellation. For example, one directors' and officers' liability insurance policy
states:
A. Cancellation or Non-Renewal [sic]
(1) This Policy may be cancelled by the [insured] at any time by written notice
to the Insurer or by surrender of this Policy to the Insurer.
This Policy may also be cancelled by or on behalf of the Insurer by deliver-
ing to the [insured] or by mailing to [the insured] by certified mail or other
first class mail, at the address stated [herein], written notice stating when,
not less than thirty (30) days thereafter, the cancellation shall be effective.
The mailing of such notice as aforesaid shall be sufficient proof of notice
and this Policy shall terminate at the date and hour specified in such
notice.
(2) If this Policy shall be cancelled by the [insured], the Insurer shall retain the
customary short rate portion of the premium.
If this Policy shall be cancelled by orion behalf of the Insurer, the Insurer
shall retain the pro-rata portion of the premium. Payment or tender of any
unearned premium by the Insurer shall not be a condition precedent to the
effectiveness of cancellations, but such payment shall be made as soon as
practicable.
(3) If the Insurer elects not to renew this Policy, the Insurer shall provide the
[insured] with no less than thirty (30) days advance notice thereof.
Zeavin & Drexler, Recent Developments in Insurance Law, in DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS'
LIABILITY INSURANCE 1987 81, 124-25 (D. Goldwasser ed. 1987).
An automobile liability insurance policy also contains similar provisions:
Cancellation
Allstate may cancel part or all of this policy by mailing notice to you .... If we
cancel becauseyou didn't pay the premium, the date of cancellation will be at least 10
days after the date of mailing. If we cancel for any other reason during the first 60
days the original policy is in effect, we will give you 10 days notice of cancellation.
After the first 60 days we will give you 20 days notice.
Proof of mailing the notice will be proof of notice. A refund, if due, will be in
proportion to the time your policy has been in effect. Cancellation will be effective
even if the refund is not made immediately.
Allstate Automobile Policy, California (emphasis in original) [copy on file at office of Loyola of
Los Angeles Law Review]. Of course, if a claim for policy benefits were made during the time
the policy was in effect, the insurer could not cancel without providing coverage for that claim.
Upon cancellation, however, the insurer would have to repay unearned premiums to the
insured.
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benefits at the trial regarding the first accident.22° However, if no con-
tract exists between the parties at the time of the second accident, then
clearly the insurer owes no obligation to the insured with respect to that
accident. Similarly, if there is no contract between the parties when they
commence litigation, the insurer does not owe the insured a duty of good
faith and fair dealing during the pendency of the action.221
Second, an insurer can raise the affirmative defense of comparative
bad faith. A breach of the insurance contract by the insured does not
provide a defense in an action for bad faith unless the noncompliance
with the policy is so grave as to permit the insurer to cancel the policy.22
Bad faith by the insured, however, does constitute a defense to a bad
faith action. In California Casualty General Insurance Co. v. Superior
Court,223 the court of appeal stated explicitly that comparative bad faith
by the insured is a valid defense.224 There, the insured alleged that the
insurer unreasonably delayed in investigating her claim and failed to offer
a sufficient settlement prior to arbitration.2 25 The insurer pleaded an af-
firmative defense of comparative bad faith, asserting that the insured and
her counsel "were guilty of bad faith conduct in the prosecuting, han-
dling and management of plaintiff's claim."' 226 The court analogized to
the doctrine of comparative fault as applied in negligence and strict lia-
bility contexts and determined that the doctrine also applied in bad faith
220. See supra text accompanying notes 53-56.
221. See Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 578, 510 P.2d 1032, 1040, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 480, 488 (1973) ("[T]he nonperformance by one party of its contractual duties cannot
excuse a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing by the other party while the contract
between them is in effect and not rescinded.").
222. See id. at 577-78, 510 P.2d at 1039-40, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 478-79.
223. 173 Cal. App. 3d 274, 218 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1985).
224. Id. at 282-83, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 822.
225. Id. at 276-77, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 818.
226. Id. at 277, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 818-19. The insurer's answer read in pertinent part:
The injuries and damages alleged by plaintiff, if any, were proximately caused by the
negligence and liability of other parties and defendants request that an allocation of
such negligence and liability be made among such other parties, and that if any liabil-
ity is found on the part of defendants, that judgment against defendants be only in
the amount which is proportionate to the extent and percentage by which defendants'
acts or omissions contributed to plaintiff's injuries or damages.
... The plaintiff and her former attorney are guilty of bad faith conduct in the
prosecuting, handling and management of the uninsured motorist claim referred to in
plaintiff's First Amended Complaint and as a proximate cause of their bad faith acts,
omissions and failure to provide full and complete information to the defendants and
their insuror [sic], these defendants request that any damages awarded against them
for bad faith be reduced by the amount of the bad faith conduct of plaintiff and her
former attorney.
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cases.
227
Third, an insurer can raise a statute of limitations defense. The im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing arises from a written con-
tract. The breach, however, sounds in tort and contract; therefore,
which statute of limitations governs such a breach is uncertain.
The two-year limitations period has been held to apply to an action
alleging breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing regardless
of the nature of the damages prayed for. In Richardson v. Allstate Insur-
ance Co. ,228 Richardson sued his insurer alleging bad faith and emotional
distress. The insurer argued that an action alleging emotional distress
suggests infringement of a personal right. Therefore, it contended, sec-
tion 340(3) of the California Code of Civil Procedure2 29 applied and the
action was subject to the one-year statute of limitations. 230 Disagreeing
with the insurer, the court of appeal found that the two-year period of
limitations of section 339(1) of the California Code of Civil Procedure
2 3'
governed the action since an action for bad faith is analogous to an action
for interference with contractual relations.23 2 The court stated that
227. The court stated that the " 'duty of good faith and fair dealing in an insurance policy is
a two-way street, running from the insured to his insurer as well as vice-versa.'" Id. at 283,
218 Cal. Rptr. at 822 (quoting Commercial Union Assurance Cos. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 26
Cal. 3d 912, 918, 610 P.2d 1038, 1041, 164 Cal. Rptr. 709, 712 (1980)). The court continued:
There can be little question but that an insurer which provides uninsured motor-
ist coverage has a reasonable expectation that if the insured suffers a loss claimed to
be covered under the uninsured motorist provisions of the policy, the insured will
promptly and accurately furnish it with all the information and evidence pertinent to
the claim that is known to the insured. If a failure of the insured to do so results in
delaying or impeding the investigation of the claim by the insurer or delays or makes
improvident the insurer's payment of the claim, any economic loss and emotional
distress caused the insured by virtue of any such nonpayment or delay in investiga-
tion or payment will have been caused either wholly or in part by the conduct of the
insured. We perceive no sound reason, nor is any suggested, why the doctrine of
comparative fault enunciated and applied to negligent conduct by the California
Supreme Court in Li v. Yellow Cab Co., and later applied as between a strictly liable
defendant and a negligent plaintiff and as between two tortfeasors one of whose liabil-
ity was based on strict products liability and the other on negligence should not be
applicable to bad faith cases.
California Casualty Gen. Ins. Co., 173 Cal. App. 3d at 283, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 822-23 (citations
omitted).
228. 117 Cal. App. 3d 8, 172 Cal. Rptr. 423 (1981).
229. Section 340(3) of the California Code of Civil Procedure provides that within one
year, one may bring "ain action for libel, slander, assault, battery, false imprisonment, seduc-
tion of a person below the age of legal consent, or for injury to or for the death of one caused
by the wrongful act or neglect of another .... " CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340(3) (West Supp.
1987).
230. Richardson, 117 Cal. App. 3d at 12, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 426.
231. Section 339(1) of the California Code of Civil Procedure states that within two years,
one may bring "[a]n action upon a contract, obligation or liability not founded upon an instru-
ment of writing .. " CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 339(1) (West Supp. 1987).
232. Richardson, 117 Cal. App. 3d at 12-13, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 426. The court stated:
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" 'the nature of the right sued upon, not the form of action or the relief
demanded, determines the applicability of the statute of limitations.' "233
However, in Frazier v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,234 another
court of appeal held that because the action was based on a written con-
tract, the four-year limitation period of section 337(1) of the California
Code of Civil Procedure applied. 35 In Frazier, plaintiff brought an ac-
tion seeking emotional distress damages from an insurer for breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The court decided that
since the action sounded in both contract and tort, the plaintiff could
make an election to proceed on either theory.2 3 6 Concluding that plain-
tiff had not made an irrevocable election to proceed on a tort theory, the
court rejected the insurer's section 340(3) argument and permitted plain-
tiff to proceed under the four-year period.23 7 Furthermore, the court
An action against an insurer for bad faith is conceptually similar to an action for
interference with contractual relations, for in both actions the primary interest of the
plaintiff which is invaded by the defendant's wrongful conduct is the plaintiff's right
to receive performance under an existing contract. A cause of action for interference
with contractual relations is governed by the two-year limitations period of section
339, subdivision 1, which applies to an "obligation or liability not founded upon an
instrument of writing."
Id. at 11-12, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 426 (citations omitted). The court concluded that:
The error in Allstate's reasoning is the assumption that a tort action against an
insurer for bad faith is based upon an alleged interference with a personal right
merely because mental distress is alleged. Breach of the implied covenant of good
faith is actionable because such conduct causes financial loss to the insured, and it is
the financial loss or risk of financial loss which defines the cause of action. Mental
distress is compensable as an aggravation of the financial damages, not as a separate
cause of action. We are satisfied, accordingly, that a tort action against the insurer
for bad faith is subject to the two-year limitations period of section 339, subdivision
1.
Id. at 13, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 426 (citation and footnote omitted). For a case which relied on
Richardson and decided similarly, see Purdy v. Pacific Automobile Ins. Co., 157 Cal. App. 3d
59, 203 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1984).
233. Richardson, 117 Cal. App. 3d at 12, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 426 (quoting Jefferson v. J.E.
French Co., 54 Cal. 2d 717, 718, 355 P.2d 643, 644, 7 Cal. Rptr. 899, 900 (1960)).
234. 169 Cal. App. 3d 90, 214 Cal. Rptr. 883 (1985).
235. Id. at 101, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 889. Section 337(1) of the California Code of Civil Proce-
dure provides that "an action upon any contract, obligation or liability founded upon an in-
strument in writing" must be brought within four years. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 337(1)
(West 1982).
236. Frazier, 169 Cal. App. 3d at 101, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 889.
237. Id. at 102, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 889-90. The court stated:
[S]ince plaintiff has the election to sue either on a contract or tort theory, if she
chooses to proceed on a contract theory she is entitled to the four-year statute of
limitations permitted by Code of Civil Procedure section 337, subdivision 1, when
suing upon breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and for damages for
emotional distress based upon such breach.
".. 'Since the bad faith cause of action sounds in both contract and tort, and
since insurance contract damages can appropriately be imposed in compensation for
mental distress, this court cannot say that the tort character of the action predomi-
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ruled that if plaintiff proceeded on the contract theory, she would be
barred from receiving punitive damages.2 38 The court did not discuss
section 339(1).239
nates. The defendants' § 340(3) argument is rejected. Plaintiffs can properly found
their bad faith contract claim on § 337(1) and its four year statute of limitations
provision."
Since Metropolitan has failed to show that Mrs. Frazier irrevocably elected to
proceed on a tort theory, she is entitled to proceed upon a contract theory entitling
her to a four-year statute of limitations.
Id. at 102-03, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 889-90 (quoting McDowell v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co., 404 F.
Supp. 136, 145 (C.D. Cal. 1975)).
238. Id. at 105, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 891-92.
239. See supra notes 231-33 and accompanying text. Some additional guidelines have been
discussed regarding the avoidance of the first-party bad faith case. What follows may be help-
ful in advising insurers:
1. Never deny a first-party claim without having fully and completely investigated
the claim to determine if it is meritorious. All too often we fail to recognize how
courts and juries may evaluate our conduct in the handling of claims. While eco-
nomic conditions have reduced staffs and have necessitated the reduction of outside
expenses, the failure to investigate a claim properly because we could not "afford" to
do a thorough job can lead to a successfully prosecuted bad faith, punitive damages
claim.
2. An insured should never be told that he or she is covered or that the claim will
be paid promptly, if the investigation has not been completed. Such a misrepresenta-
tion made before completion of the investigation can be the basis for a bad faith
claim.
3. Never insert in a claim file any comment, statement, or observation which you
would not want a jury to hear. Although this seems to be elementary, claims files
continue to describe the insured by race, creed, color, or nationality. Comments
about the insured's dress, personal appearance, or marital status should likewise not
find their way into the claim file. In fact, no personal comments about the insured
should be inserted in the claim file unless pertinent to the issue of coverage or to the
issue of damages.
4. Never threaten the insured with litigation as an attempt to secure a reduced
settlement.
5. Do not require the insured to take steps not reasonably required in the policy as
a precondition to payment.
6. Promptly communicate the company's position after your investigation is
completed.
7. When it appears likely that a denied claim of any consequence will result in
litigation, as is almost always the case, consult with counsel before denying the claim.
While this will not materially increase your expense, reliance upon the advice of
counsel may provide a defense to a punitive damages claim.
8. Honor all time deadlines found in the policy or required by statute. Failure to
honor these time deadlines may constitute a waiver of the company's rights under
certain policy provisions.
9. In situations where only a portion of a claim is in dispute, tender to the insured
the amount not in dispute.
10. When denying a claim, cite the provisions of the policy upon which you rely.
11. Maintain a well-documented file which demonstrates your efforts to be fair and
cooperative and which will avoid embarrassment if the claim file ever is produced to
the insured, a court, or a jury.
12. Compose all letters you write to the insured as if you expect that a jury will
hear them.
13. If a denial letter written to the insured or the insured's counsel contains accusa-
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B. Section 1152 of the California Evidence Code
Section 1152 of the California Evidence Code precludes admission
of settlement offers and conduct or statements made in settlement negoti-
ations if offered to prove liability for the damages to which the negotia-
tions relate.2' However, the majority in White v. Western Title
Insurance Co. 241 affirmed the admission of Western Title's settlement of-
fers to prove its tortious breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.242 In so doing, the White court misapplied relevant case law and
ignored the policy considerations underlying section 1152.
1. Case law
The White majority exclusively relied on one case, Fletcher v. West-
ern National Life Insurance Co.,243 to support the proposition that the
settlement offers were admissible to prove the instrumentality of the tort
of bad faith breach of contract, but not to prove liability for breach of
contract damages. In Fletcher, the insurer, in two letters, falsely accused
the insured of concealing a congenital back defect.2 1 In the second let-
tion of wrong-doing, i.e., arson or overevaluation of the claim, do not send copies to
others. Distribution could set the stage for a defamation action.
14. Before 'drafts are issued to an insured, consult the declarations page of the pol-
icy to determine the identities of additional insureds, mortgagees, or loss payees.
Failure to include these individuals on a draft could result in creating duplicate expo-
sure under a single policy.
15. When unsure about facts, couch internal memoranda with words such as "it
appears that" or "the evidence suggests that."
16. List all policy defenses in denial letters to avoid claims that the company may
have waived certain defenses or certain policy exclusions.
Hilliker & Marick, The Bad Faith Case: Litigation Techniques and Strategies, From the De-
fense Perspective, in BAD FAITH LITIGATION AND INSURER VS. INSURER DISPUTES 99, 135-37
(R. Williams ed. 1986) (quoting Cozen & Danielski, Bad Faith and Extra-Contractual Dam-
ages: The Defense Perspective, in LIABILITY BEYOND THE INSURANCE CONTRACT (CPCU
Monograph Winter 1985)).
240. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1152 (West Supp. 1987). Section 1152 states in pertinent part:
Evidence that a person has, in compromise or from humanitarian motives, furnished
or offered or promised to furnish money or any other thing, act, or service to another
who has sustained or will sustain or claims that he has sustained or will sustain loss
or damage, as well as any conduct or statements made in negotiation thereof, is inad-
missible to prove his liability for the loss or damage or any part of it.
Id.
241. 40 Cal. 3d 870, 710 P.2d 309, 221 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1985).
242. Id. at 888-89, 710 P.2d at 318-19, 221 Cal. Rptr. 518-19.
243. 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970).
244. Fletcher, the insured, had made a claim under a disability policy for an injury which
he sustained while at work. Western National Life Insurance Co. had paid Fletcher $2250
when it determined that Fletcher suffered from a preexisting back illness. Id. at 390, 89 Cal.
Rptr. at 85-86. There were no facts which suggested that Fletcher knew about this condition.
In fact, he "denied any previous back trouble and any knowledge of any such preexisting
condition." Id. at 389, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 85. The insurer's accusatory letters to Fletcher were
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ter, the insurer also offered to compromise Fletcher's claim under his
disability policy by allowing him to retain the payments he had already
received.2 45 Fletcher decided not to accept the compromise settlement
and subsequently instituted a lawsuit against the insurer. At trial,
Fletcher offered both letters into evidence and the court admitted
them.24 6 The insurer argued that section 1152 barred the second letter
containing an offer of settlement from being introduced into evidence.247
The court responded to the insurer's contention by stating:
If the second letter... were considered an offer to compromise,
it would be an offer to compromise the claim of liability under
the policy. Plaintiff, however, did not offer the letter to prove
liability under the policy but, rather, as a part of his proof of
the instrumentality of the tort. Section 1152, therefore, did not
preclude its admission.248
Although the court did not expressly define the term "instrumentality of
the tort," it is clear from the court's analysis that the term denotes the
elements of the tort.24 9 In its discussion, it is apparent that the Fletcher
court admitted the second letter as evidence of the insurer's conduct
which caused Fletcher's emotional distress.250
The Fletcher court's distinction between proof of the instrumentality
of the tort and proof of liability under the claim, when applied to White,
seems artificial. In Fletcher, the settlement offer was made with respect
to Fletcher's claim against the insurer for breach of his insurance con-
tract. Applying section 1152, evidence of the settlement offer would not
be admissible to prove liability for the breach of contract claim.
Fletcher, however, did not attempt to introduce the settlement offer as
evidence of the breach of contract claim, but offered it as evidence of a
apparently based upon a statement in a report by one of Fletcher's examining physicians. Id.
Although several physicians were involved in Fletcher's treatment, id. at 387, 89 Cal. Rptr. at
83, the insurer failed to make any further investigation of Fletcher's possible congenital back
defect. Id. at 389, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 85. Accordingly, the insurer terminated all payments and
demanded that Fletcher repay the insurer $2250, less the amount of premiums actually paid.
Id. at 390, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 85. In a later letter, the insurer proposed to allow Fletcher to keep
the $2250 in consideration for the cancellation of the policy and a full release of liability. Id.
Fletcher could not work because of his disability and the payments under the disability policy
were a major source of his income. Id. at 389, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 85. As a result of the accusa-
tory letters and the discontinuance of payments under the policy, Fletcher claimed that he
suffered emotional distress. Id. at 394, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 88.
245. Id. at 390, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 85-86.
246. Id. at 396, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 90.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. See id. at 398-401, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 91-93.
250. Id.
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wholly unrelated claim25 1-intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Accordingly, the court admitted the settlement offers as evidence of out-
rageous conduct, an element of the tort.
In White, the settlement offers were made with respect to White's
claim against Western Title for breach of contract. However, the settle-
ment offers were not introduced as evidence of a wholly unrelated tort,
but were admitted to prove the related tort of bad faith breach of con-
tract.252 Since there can be no claim for bad faith breach without a claim
for breach of contract, the two are inextricably intertwined.253 A breach
of contract claim alleges that one party has not rendered performance
after an agreed condition has occurred.254 A claim for breach of the duty
251. Other cases have held that settlement offers are admissible to show the validity or
invalidity of a different claim. For example, in Fieldson Assocs., Inc. v. Whitecliff Labs., Inc.,
276 Cal. App. 2d 770, 81 Cal. Rptr. 332 (1969), plaintiff sued defendant for breach of contract
and defendant cross-complained for lost profits. Plaintiff offered into evidence a number of
letters which had passed between the parties after transmittal of a purchase order. Defendant
objected on the ground that some of its letters to plaintiff contained settlement offers and were
therefore barred by section 1152. The court disagreed and held that the letters were not admit-
ted for the purpose of proving liability for the breach of contract claim, but were instead
admitted for the limited purpose of determining the intent of the parties at the time the
purchase order was transmitted. The court stated:
Here the letters were not used to prove either liability for, or invalidity of, the claim
concerning which the offer of compromise was made. Rather, they were received to
show the invalidity of a different claim: [defendant's cross-] claim for lost profits
under the purchase order, which was never mentioned in the negotiations ....
Id. at 772, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 334.
Another example is Warner Constr. Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 2 Cal. 3d 285, 466 P.2d
996, 85 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1970). In Warner, plaintiff sued for breach of warranty and fraud.
Plaintiff contractor sought to introduce its correspondence with defendant municipality about
the need for additional expense to construct a retaining wall. Despite the city's objection that
it was part of settlement negotiations, the trial judge admitted the correspondence. On appeal,
the California Supreme Court held that the trial court "could properly have admitted the
evidence for the limited purpose of proving plaintiff's bona fide and good faith efforts to reach
an agreement so that work could be resumed." Id. at 296, 466 P.2d at 1003, 85 Cal. Rptr. at
451.
252. The only difference between tortious breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing and the garden variety bad faith breach of contract is the existence of certain factors
regarding the relationship of the contracting parties. For a discussion of those factors, see
infra note 283 and accompanying text. The contract claim is elevated to a tort, but the princi-
ples underlying the basic claim remain the same.
253. Turning the tables, however, the two claims are not necessarily inextricably inter-
twined, for it is possible to have a breach of contract claim without a bad faith breach of
contract claim.
254. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts states that "[a] condition is an event, not cer-
tain to occur, which must occur, unless its non-occurrence is excused before performance
under a contract becomes due." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 224 (1981). A
"condition" is "an event which qualifies a duty under a contract." Id. § 224 comment a. For
example, a condition would be the occurrence of loss or damage covered under an insurance
policy. Upon the happening of the event, the insurer would have a duty to provide policy
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of good faith and fair dealing describes the manner in which that per-
formance was or was not rendered. 5  Courts have merely ficticiously
separated the two claims.256 Consequently, the White court allowed into
evidence settlement offers to prove liability for the very claims which the
offers were meant to settle.
Furthermore, breach of the duty of good faith is elevated to a tort
only when a special relationship exists between the contracting parties.
257
California courts, thus far, have found this relationship to exist in a lim-
ited number of contractual situations, 25 18 including the insurer-insured re-
lationship.259 In White, evidence of settlement offers was made
admissible because of the tortious nature of the breach. If, however, the
breach of good faith and fair dealing had occurred within a non insur-
ance contractual relationship, there would have been no tort, and the
settlement offers would have been inadmissible. White, therefore, has
written a new rule: evidence of settlement offers is admissible when there
is a special relationship and is inadmissible when there is not. Surely,
this result is not what the legislature intended when it enacted section
1152.260 It intended that evidence of settlement offers be excluded to
promote candor between the parties and thereby to encourage prompt
and equitable settlements.261
In his dissent to the majority opinion in White, Justice Lucas drew
another distinction between Fletcher and White. Lucas argued that "the
benefits. "Performance under a contract becomes due when all necessary events, including
conditions. . . have occurred so that a failure of performance will be a breach." Id. § 224
comment b.
255. There are a number of ways in which the duty can be breached. For instance:
[B]ad faith breach may be overt or consist of inaction .... A complete catalogue of
types of bad faith is impossible, but the following types are among those which have
been recognized in judicial decisions: evasion of the spirit of the bargain, lack of
diligence and slacking off, willful rendering of imperfect performance, abuse of power
to specifiy terms, and interference with or failure to cooperate in the other party's
performance.
Id. § 205 comment d.
256. Cf Seaman's Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d
1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984). In Seaman's, the California Supreme Court stated:
[P]arties of roughly equal bargaining power are free to shape the contours of their
agreement and to include provisions for attorney fees and liquidated damages in the
event of a breach. They may not be permitted to disclaim the covenant of good faith
but they are free, within reasonable limits at least, to agree upon the standards by
which application of the covenant is to be measured. In such contracts, it may be
difficult to distinguish between breach of the covenant and breach of contract ....
Id. at 769, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted),
257. See infra note 283.
258. See infra note 283.
259. See supra note 4.
260. See infra note 277.
261. See infra note 277.
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offers of settlement which the court found admissible were made prior to
the filing of an action against the insurer.. ."262 in Fletcher. By contrast,
the Whites offered into evidence settlement offers which were made after
the filing of the lawsuit. Justice Lucas' attempt to distinguish the facts of
Fletcher and White on this point might have been relevant if there had
been no dispute in Fletcher prior to the filing of the action. But had there
been no dispute, then there would have been no need for the insurer to
attempt to settle or negotiate Fletcher's claim.
In re Marriage of Schoettgen263 nullifies this temporal distinction.
In Schoettgen, Mr. Schoettgen prepared a list, prior to litigation, setting
forth those properties which he believed at the time to be community
property. On the list he included property which, he claimed, he mistak-
enly believed was made community property by operation of law. 2" At
trial, Mrs. Schoettgen offered the list into evidence. Mr. Schoettgen ob-
jected on the ground that the document was part of a settlement offer,
and, therefore, barred from evidence under section 1152.265 The trial
court overruled the objection holding that "it was not an offer to settle
litigation because the point of settlement of litigation had not been
reached at the time the document was written. ' 266 The appellate court
did not reverse the trial court's ruling because it found that Mr.
Schoettgen was not unfairly prejudiced by the admission of this evi-
dence.267 However, the court of appeal reversed stating, "[m]ore realisti-
cally, Husband was preparing for a possible argument over the division
of property, and thus may well have started a process of 'negotiation'
which brought his list within [section 1152]. "268 Similarly, the letter
from the insurer to Fletcher was written in preparation for possible liti-
gation. A negotiable controversy existed. Under the reasoning of the
Schoettgen court, admissiblity does not turn on whether the settlement
offer was made before or after the initiation of litigation as long as a
dispute exists between the parties.
Schoettgen had not yet been decided when Fletcher and White were
handed down. Consequently, neither court could have used Schoettgen
as authority. But in reaching its decision, the Schoettgen court relied on
262. White, 40 Cal. 3d at 894, 710 P.2d at 323, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 523 (Lucas, J., dissenting)
(emphasis in original).
263. 183 Cal. App. 3d 1, 227 Cal. Rptr. 758 (1986).
264. Id. at 5, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 760.
265. Id. at 6, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 760.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 8, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 762.
268. Id.
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Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. California Coastal Commission,269 a case which
was decided before White.
In Georgia-Pacific, a section 1152 question was raised by the Califor-
nia Coastal Commission. The trial court excluded evidence that, during
administrative hearings, Georgia-Pacific had offered to dedicate certain
easements if its permit applications were granted.27° In ruling that the
evidence was inadmissible pursuant to section 1152, the trial court stated
that "Georgia-Pacific had offered 'nothing more than a compromise, at-
tempted compromise of litigation.' ,271 The Commission objected on the
grounds that there was no lawsuit in existence at the time Georgia-Pa-
cific made the offers.272
On appeal, the court stated:
The trial court's finding that the offers were made in "at-
tempted compromise of litigation" is supported by the evidence
of them in the administrative record. The relevance of an offer
of compromise, as an "admission by conduct," is overriden by
the "public policy in favor of settlement of disputes" which un-
derlies Evidence Code section 1152. The policy applied here
even if the precise language of the statute did not, and its appli-
cation was not affected by the fact that litigation was not pend-
ing when the offers were made by Georgia-Pacific.
21 3
Hence, even though no litigation was pending at the time the settle-
ment offers were made, the court kept the offers out of evidence because
they were made in an attempt to settle future litigation. Georgia-Pacific
nullifies Justice Lucas' pre-, post-litigation distinction. 4  It instructs
that courts should not be concerned with whether the settlement offers
were made prior to or after the filing of litigation; they should be con-
269. 132 Cal. App. 3d 678, 183 Cal. Rptr. 395 (1982). Georgia-Pacific Corp. (Georgia-
Pacific) operated a lumber processing facility on its own land located on the northern Califor-
nia coastline. Id. at 683, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 397. Georgia-Pacific sought to construct four
additional facilities on its property, and applied to the California Coastal Commission (Com-
mission) for building permits. Id. at 683, 183 Cal. Rptr at 398. The Commission granted the
permits on the condition that Georgia-Pacific dedicate certain public access easements to the
shoreline. Id. Georgia-Pacific then brought an action against the Commission by petitioning
the superior court for a writ of administrative mandamus compelling the Commission to issue
the building permits without the access conditions. Id. at 684, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 398.
270. Id. at 693, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 403-04.
271. Id. (quoting court below).
272. Id. at 693, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 404.
273. Id. (citations omitted).
274. It is important to note that although Georgia-Pacific might have been persuasive au-
thority, it would not have been binding authority since the case was decided by the court of
appeal.
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cerned with the purpose of the offer. If made to compromise possible
future litigation, or present litigation, then the offers should not be ad-
mitted into evidence. To allow these types of offers into evidence would
be to undermine the policy behind section 1152.275
2. Policy
Rules of evidence, generally, are promulgated with underlying pol-
icy considerations.2 76 The policy behind section 1152 of the California
Evidence Code is to promote candor and fairness between the parties
during the settlement process.27 7 One case, Fieldson Associates, Inc. v.
Whitecliff Laboratories, Inc.,278 stated very lucidly the legislature's intent
275. See infra note 277.
276. See generally FED. R. EVID. advisory committee's notes.
277. The Law Revision Commission's comment to section 1152 states in part:
The rule excluding offers is based upon the public policy in favor of the settlement of
disputes without litigation. The same public policy requires that admissions made
during settlement negotiations also be excluded. The rule of the Forster case that
permits such statements to be admitted places a premium on the form of the state-
ment. [Section 1152 overruled People v. Forster, 58 Cal.2d 257, 373 P.2d 630, 23
Cal. Rptr. 582 (1962) (certain statements made during settlement negotiations were
admissible into evidence as admissions)] .... The rule of the Forster case is changed
by Section 1152 because that rule prevents the complete candor between the parties
that is most conducive to settlement.
7 CALIFORNIA L. REVIsION COMM'N, REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS & STUDIES 29, 218
(1965).
278. 276 Cal. App. 2d 770, 81 Cal. Rptr. 332 (1969). In Fieldson, Fieldson Associates, Inc.
(Fieldson), a packaging firm, entered into a contract with Whitecliff Laboratories, Inc.
(Whitecliff) whereby Fieldson was to supply display cartons to Whitecliff. Id. at 771, 81 Cal.
Rptr. at 333. Fieldson had also allegedly contracted with Whitecliff to purchase 100,000 units
of one of Whitecliff's products, a one-cup coffee maker called "Brew-A-Cup." Id.
Fieldson initiated a lawsuit against Whitecliff to recover the display carton contract price
of $3011.14. Id. The court did not state why. Whitecliff cross-complained for loss of profits
allegedly resulting from Fieldson's completed purchase of only 35,136 of the 100,000 Brew-A-
Cup units. Id. The principal issue in the case was whether the written purchase order refer-
ring to the 100,000 units was intended to be binding on Fieldson. Id.
Fieldson offered in evidence a collection of letters which passed between the presidents of
the two companies after transmittal of the purchase order. Id. Whitecliff objected since sev-
eral of the letters written by its president contained compromise offers which were inadmissible
under section 1152. Id. The court, however, ruled that the letters were admissible because
they helped determine the intent of the parties at the time the purchase order was transmitted.
Id. at 772, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 334. The court stated:
The letters were received for the sole purpose of showing the nonbinding nature of
the "purchase order" in order to defeat [Whitecliff's] cross-complaint. When consid-
ered for that limited purpose, the letters had no bearing upon the primary validity of
the claim asserted by [Fieldson] against [Whitecliff] for the unused cartons. Evidence
Code section 1152 provides that evidence that a party has offered to compromise a
claim is inadmissible to prove liability for that claim .... Here the letters were not
used to prove either liability for, or invalidity of, the claim concerning which the offer
of compromise was made. Rather, they were received to show the invalidity of a
different claim: [Whitecliff's] claim for lost profits under the purchase order, which
was never mentioned in the negotiations concerning the cartons.
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behind passing the statute. The Fieldson court stated:
[T]he obvious policy of the statute is to avoid deterring parties
from making offers of settlement and to facilitate candid discus-
sion which may lead to settlement of disputes. Negotitation
might well be discouraged if a party knew that statements made
by him (or his failure to make certain statements) might later
be used to prove the invalidity of some other claim which he
wished to assert.2 79
Moreover, negotiation might be discouraged if a party knew that his
statements or offers might later be used to prove his liability on a related
claim. If the admissibility of such evidence tends to "inhibit candid dis-
cussion or deter either party from attempting to effect a compromise,"2 '
then the evidence should be barred by section 1152.
After White v. Western Title Insurance Co.,281 any settlement offers
made before or during the course of litigation will be admissible to prove
the instrumentality of the tort of bad faith breach of contract. This deci-
sion undermines the clear intent of the legislature. Insurance companies
and other defendants who fall into the tortious bad faith category will be
very wary about attempting to settle potential or pending litigation for
fear that their offers will or may be used as harmful evidence against
them. There will no longer be candid discussion which may lead to set-
tlement of disputes. Litigation will be the only means of resolving dis-
putes between the parties unless plaintiffs would be willing to waive their
right to offer evidence of settlement negotiations.
The rule in White is a double-edged sword. Under this rule, even if
defendants make a reasonable, good faith offer, they may still be subject
to additional liability for bad faith breach of contract. For example, in
White, Western Title's final offer to White was $5000. This offer was
made in light of White's claim of loss of approximately $63,000. The
jury ultimately determined that White suffered a loss of only $8400.
Western Title, however, was still held liable to White for tortious bad
faith breach of contract in the amount of $20,000, because of its failure to
settle in good faith even though the jury's verdict was only $3000 greater
Id. at 772, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 333-34 (emphasis in original). The court concluded:
[The fact that there were negotiations at all was significant only as showing that the
parties were in communication without [Whiteclifi] having asserted a claim which it
would have been natural to mention. The admissibility of such evidence for the lim-
ited purpose described above could have had no tendency to inhibit candid discussion
or deter either party from attempting to effect a compromise.
Id. at 773, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 334 (citations omitted).
279. Id. at 773, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 334.
280. Id.
281. 40 Cal. 3d 870, 710 P.2d 309, 221 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1985).
November 1987] COMMON-LAW BAD FAITH
than the offer which was allegedly in bad faith. Accordingly, defendants
will not want to negotiate even if they could negotiate in a reasonable
manner. But if they do not attempt to settle, they will be held liable for
tortious bad faith breach of contract because of their failure to settle in
good faith.
V. CONCLUSION
In light of the considerations enumerated above, White v. Western
Title Insurance Co. 282 represents an unwarranted and unfair extension in
the area of bad faith litigation. This decision threatens unjustly to thrust
insurers into the precarious position of being subject to astronomical
awards while being denied the ability to defend themselves effectively.
The California Supreme Court has declared open season on insurance
companies and has stripped them of their ability to retaliate. Insurers,
consequently, will become easy prey to litigious insureds.
Furthermore, the California Supreme Court did not specifically
limit its opinion to insurance contract litigation. The failure to limit
White to its facts is significant because California courts have liberally
expanded the contractual relationships where tortious bad faith breach of
contract may attach.283 Consequently, the White decision may well have
282. 40 Cal. 3d 870, 710 P.2d 309, 221 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1985).
283. See Seaman's Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d
1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984). See also supra note 141. In Seaman's, the court specifically
allowed a tort remedy in the situation where a party "seeks to shield itself from liability by
denying, in bad faith and without probable cause, that the contract exists." Id. at 769, 686
P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363. Most importantly, the court also stated that the tort cause
of action should be extended to commercial contracts involving relationships between the par-
ties with "similar characteristics" to those found in the insurer-insured context. Id. at 768-69,
686 P.2d at 1166, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362.
In the same year, a California Court of Appeal handed down its decision in Wallis v.
Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 3d 1109, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123 (1984). In Wallis, the court listed
the following factors that could make a noninsurance contract subject to the bad faith
doctrine:
(1) the parties must have inherently unequal bargaining positions;
(2) the contract must have been entered into for a non-profit motivation, i.e., to
secure peace of mind, security or future protection;
(3) ordinary contract damages would be inadequate because (a) they do not require
the breaching party to account for its actions, and (b) they do not make the inferior
party whole;
(4) the non-breaching party has no alternative source of protection, having trusted
the other party to perform; and
(5) the breaching party is aware of the vulnerability and trust of the other.
Id. at 1118, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 129.
Combining both Seaman's and Wallis, California courts have expanded tortious bad faith
breach of contract to apply to various noninsurance contract relationships. The areas in which
this phenomenon has occurred are:
(I) Employer-employee: See, e.g., Khanna v. Microdata Corp., 170 Cal. App. 3d
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opened the door for enterprising plaintiffs' attorneys to argue for the ex-
tension of White's analysis into noninsurance contract suits since White
grants plaintiffs an enormous advantage in proving a defendant's tortious
bad faith breach of contract.
Henry Weinstein*
250, 215 Cal. Rptr. 860 (1985); Wayte v. Rollins Int'l, Inc., 169 Cal. App. 3d 1, 215
Cal. Rptr. 59 (1985); Rulon-Miller v. International Business Mach. Corp., 162 Cal.
App. 3d 241, 208 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1984); Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 152
Cal. App. 3d 467, 199 Cal. Rptr. 613 (1984); Crosier v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 150
Cal. App. 3d 1132, 198 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1983); Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman v. Cohen,
146 Cal. App. 3d 200, 194 Cal. Rptr. 180 (1983); Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116
Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981); Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., IIl
Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
(2) Bank-depositor: See, e.g., Commercial Cotton Co. v. United Cal. Bank, 163
Cal. App. 3d 511, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1985).
(3) Manufacturer-consumer: See, e.g., Gomez v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 169 Cal.
App. 3d 921, 215 Cal. Rptr. 507 (1985); Quigley v. Pet, Inc., 162 Cal. App. 3d 877,
208 Cal. Rptr. 394 (1984).
In Gomez, the court implied that it would have found tortious bad faith breach
of contract. The court, however, held that the plaintiff was adequately protected by
the Beverly-Song Act which allowed the plaintiff to recover treble damages under the
circumstances of the case. Consequently, a finding of tortious bad faith breach of
contract was unnecessary.
(4) Franchisor-distributor: In Prestin v. Mobil Oil Corp., 741 F.2d 268 (9th Cir.
1984), the Ninth Circuit, interpreting California law, stated that a franchisor may
not in bad faith terminate a franchise agreement despite language in the agreement
that gave the franchisor a specific right to terminate for any reason. See also Gianelli
Dist. Co. v. Beck & Co., 172 Cal. App. 3d 1020, 219 Cal. Rptr. 203 (1985) (special
relationship due to unequal bargaining power or special element of reliance did not
exist, and, therefore, no bad faith breach of contract).
* The author wishes to thank Jack Gold for his guidance, support and inspiration.
